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Summary 
 
This paper contributes both to the debate on the effects of regional security 
organizations and to the debate on democratic peace. It argues that even if 
international organizations as such may not be able to influence the conflict behavior 
of their member states, the subgroup of interdemocratic institutions is well suited to do 
so. The form of interdemocratic institutions differs in two significant respects from the 
form of traditional institutions: they are more densely connected via transnational links 
with the societies of their member states (embeddedness), and they are more densely 
connected via transgovernmental links with the political systems of member states 
(communicative arena). Due to their characteristic form, interdemocratic institutions 
channel more information from and to member states and increase the autonomy of 
policy fields. As a result, they effectively bloc typical escalatory paths to war and 
foster deeper forms of cooperation. Hence, we argue that interdemocratic security 
organizations constitute the missing link in the causal chain of the democratic peace 
theory. In a first step, we unfold this argument by drawing on the rich literature on 
international organizations, theories of rational design, theories of war, and the 
democratic peace theory. We then specify and operationalize the form characteristics 
of regional security organizations. In the empirical part of the paper, we contribute to 
the research on comparing regional institutions by presenting detailed data on form 
characteristics of five differently composed regional security institutions. We compare 
two democratic institutions – the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the 
European Union (EU) - with two Latin American security institutions – the 
Organization of American States (OAS) and Mercosur/Mercosul (Spanish: Mercado 
Común del Sur, Portuguese: Mercado Comum do Sul, English: Southern Common 
Market) - which are composed of recently democratized countries, and a traditional 
institution – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) - whose members 
are still mainly non-democratic. We demonstrate that NATO and the EU are indeed 
embedded in strong networks of societal actors and that both provide wide 
communicative arenas. We further demonstrate that Latin American security 
organizations, as their member-states became democratic, are developing those form 
characteristics as well. Although the security environment in Southeast Asia is more 
fragile than in the Southern Cone, ASEAN continues to be a mostly intergovernmental 
organization. 
The analysis is part of a broader project studying the international organization of the 
democratic peace. In this paper we restrict ourselves to establishing a relationship 
between the properties of member states and the form characteristics of international 
institutions, which are theoretically relevant for judging the effectiveness of those 
institutions in preventing war. In the further course of the project, it will be studied 
empirically whether the differences of institutional form characteristics identified here 
are indeed causally responsible for the stable peace in Western Europe and the recent 
settlement of former rivalries in the Southern Cone of Latin America. The case of 
Southeast Asia contrasts with these findings. 
We gratefully acknowledge the generous support of our research project by the 
German Foundation for Peace Research (DSF). 
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1. International Organizations and their Contribution to Peace: Theoretical 
Reflections and Empirical Findings 
 
Whether international organizations (IOs) give rise to peaceful relations among their 
members is one of the most extensively discussed and yet still controversial issues 
within the disciplines of Political Theory and International Relations. This is not the 
place to recount the extensive debate on the effectiveness of IOs. In the following 
pages, we will restrict ourselves to a brief reconstruction of the theoretical debate with 
the focus on two recent developments which are relevant for our approach: the trend to 
differentiate among IOs and the growing significance given to second image factors. 
 
 
1.1. Debating the Effects of International Organizations: The early Phase 
 
Since the days of enlightenment, proponents of liberal theory have maintained that IOs 
are a crucial building bloc of lasting peace. Detailed plans for a confederation of states, 
including stipulations banning the unilateral use of force, provisions for a system of 
arbitration and adjudication, and binding mutual assistance clauses, have been 
presented as early as 1711 by the legendary Abbé de Saint-Pierre. Likewise, 
international organizations constitute one pillar of Kant's “Perpetual Peace”, and figure 
prominently in the writings of other authors in the liberal tradition (see the overviews 
in Czempiel 1986; Muldoon 2004). In the 19th century, this concept found its way into 
the political realm. It inspired the Concert of Europe, the Hague Peace Conferences 
and eventually Wilson's Fourteen points. After the failure of the League of Nations, 
the idea that international institutions contribute to peace did not vanish but resurfaced 
in the guise of functional theory (Mitrany 1966), neo-functional theory (Haas 1958; 
Nye 1971), and neo-liberal institutionalism (Keohane 1984; Axelrod 1984).  
Despite the long tradition of reflections on international organizations as a cornerstone 
of peace, it remains contested whether IOs exert an independent influence on the 
behavior of their member states at all. Liberal institutionalists argue that institutions 
reduce transaction costs and thereby foster cooperation even among rational egoists. 
Institutions 
• enlarge the shadow of the future and thus limit the risks of exploitation and render 
unilateral strategies less attractive, 
• reduce the negotiation costs of individual agreements, 
• increase the possibility of issue-linkages and side payments and thus enlarge the 
area of Pareto-optimal solutions, 
• increase transparency by demarcating more precisely the border between allowed 
and prohibited behavior and by providing additional possibilities for verification, 
• alleviate the identification of common solutions. 
After more than two decades of intensive debate, it is still contested whether or not 
these mechanisms do indeed allow for long-term cooperation in the field of security 
among rational egoists in an anarchic environment (Hasenclever 2002a).  
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Constructivists rather perceive IOs as a shell for cooperation while the explanatory 
burden rests on ideational factors like common ideas, norms, and identities (Risse-
Kappen 1995b; Risse-Kappen 1996: 371). 
Realists mount an even more serious attack against the proposition that international 
organizations contribute to the avoidance of war. Although the different branches of 
the family of realist theory concur in rejecting the liberal optimism, they disagree in 
their understanding of the role of IOs. According to neo-realists, international 
organizations are mere epiphenomena. While IOs may provide some technical services 
for their member states, they are unlikely to influence the behavior of their members in 
the area of high politics (Mearsheimer 2001). Security institutions are either symbolic 
or only exist only as temporary and shallow alliances (Snyder 1997). In contrast, 
classical realists accede to the notion that international organizations matter. They can 
be – and in many cases are - used by powerful states with a view to rationalizing and 
stabilizing their hegemonic position (for an overview cf. Schweller/Priess 1997). If 
institutions do indeed flourish only because lock-in mechanisms and path-
dependencies conserve patterns of interaction which favor the most powerful, more 
attention needs to be directed towards questions concerning the ethical status of 
institutions (Martin/Simmons 1999: 106). A third position within the realist tradition 
holds exactly the opposite view. It assumes that multilateral institutions are the 
preferred tool of weak states in order to bind the more powerful states (Kagan 2003).  
Empirically, this question is equally contested. Comparative case studies are rare and 
their findings ambivalent.1 Quantitative studies are more numerous, but lead to 
discordant results. The early research by Singer and Wallace (1970) as well as 
Rittberger (1973a) did not show a statistically significant correlation between 
membership in or strength of international organizations and conflict behavior.  
Domke (1988: 148), too, concluded that “(...) there does not appear to be any 
relationship between IOs, taken as an undifferentiated whole, and decisions for war”.  
In contrast, more recent quantitative studies confirm that IO membership does indeed 
reduce the propensity for conflict involvement (Russett/Oneal 2001). However, even 
this seminal work only found a weak negative correlation between IO membership and 
involvement in militarized interstate disputes (MIDs); and the robustness of this 
already weak relationship seems to depend on the chosen statistical method 
(Pevehouse/Russett 2006). Additionally, the IO-peace linkage seems to be especially 
sensitive to sample selection, which is crucial in any quantitative study. For example, 
if in a dyad-year approach all possible dyads are included in the sample, no significant 
relationship between IO membership and peace emerges, whereas a sample of only 
politically relevant dyads suggests a positive relationship (Russett/Oneal 2001: 172). 
Most of the above mentioned quantitative studies use a similar research design.2 They 
assess the impact of membership in all kinds of international organizations on conflict 
behavior. Domke (1988) questioned this approach by arguing that international 
                                                 
1 For example, Krebs’ (1999) study of the Greco-Turkish conflict suggests that both countries’ 
membership in NATO exacerbated their conflict behavior. By contrast, the Human Security Center 
(2005) states a correlation between the reduced level of interstate violence after the end of the East-
West conflict and the increased efforts in institution building. 
2 In contrast, Rittberger (1973a) concentrates on membership in the United Nations (UN) and its 
predecessor organizations and uses budgetary expenditures of IOs as independent variable. 
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organizations are not alike. An analysis should take their vast differences into account. 
Although Domke’s findings were inconclusive, too, the plausibility of this research 
strategy has triggered several attempts to disaggregate IOs and ascribe possible 
differences in effectiveness to differences in their form.  
 
 
1.2. Disaggregating International Organizations 
 
For a long time, functionalists have assumed that the form of international institutions 
follows their function. Building on this classical formula, theories of rational 
institutional choice explain the variation of international organizations with 
prospective member states’ demand for certain goods or benefits (Peters 1999). Their 
approach is based on the premise that the creation and maintenance of international 
organizations involves costs. Since states are cost sensitive, they design institutions 
purposefully in order to advance their interests and to minimize costs and risks 
(Abbot/Snidal 1998). Depending on the function or - to use a more encompassing term 
- the social environment (independent variable), states will create institutions with a 
specific form (dependent variable) in order to maximize benefits and to reduce risks. 
The term “social environment” refers to collective action problems involved, the 
number of relevant players, the amount and quality of information available etc. The 
term “form” may include institutional characteristics like scope, range, voting 
procedures, precision of rules, delegation of authority to supranational bodies and 
escape clauses.  
In a second step, form can then be modeled as an independent variable, which 
influences the effectiveness of the organization (dependent variable). Effectiveness 
refers to the ability of the institution to realign member states behavior with stated 
goals of the organization (Pierson 1998).  
Game theory offers itself as a suitable tool for modeling the independent variable 
(Martin 1992; Zürn 1992). Social situations may resemble collaboration, coordination 
or assurance games.3 Theories of institutional choice would expect that actors in 
collaboration games, knowing that all sides have strong incentives to defect, are likely 
to create highly institutionalized organizations with precise rules, extensive monitoring 
capabilities, arbitration mechanisms and, possibly, provisions for sanctions. 
Coordination games, like “The Battle of the Sexes”, are characterized by multiple 
equilibrium outcomes. As soon as the players have agreed on one equilibrium, they are 
likely to stick with their choice. In those situations, defection is less likely and 
monitoring less important. Hence, institutional choice theories assume that in those 
cases, states would not waste scarce resources on the definition of precise rules, 
mechanisms for conflict mediation and arbitration, and elaborated monitoring 
mechanisms. They would, however, want to have institutions which facilitate 
discussion, bargaining and side-payments. In assurance games (coordination games 
without distributional conflict), where cooperation is the preferred strategy of all 
players, strong institutions are even less relevant to achieve cooperation.  
                                                 
3 In addition to those three games, the literature on game theories refers to suasion games and rambo 
games. They are neglected here due to space constraints. 
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Although this kind of abstract modeling undoubtedly enriches our conceptual 
understanding, attempts to use these models as tools for the explanation of empirical 
cases have encountered a range of obstacles. Firstly, most social situations do not fit 
easily with one of the ideal game types, but are characterized by both the temptations 
to defect and by distributional issues (Martin/Simmons 1999; Keck 1997a). Lisa 
Martin (1992: 781) concurs by conceding that even in assurance games, states cannot 
be sure whether the other side is not motivated by collaboration preferences. Secondly, 
many problematic social situations allow for more than one institutional solution. Due 
to those restrictions, it has proven difficult to establish a clear-cut relationship between 
function and form. Even Martin acknowledges that, at this abstract level, “the outcome 
remains indeterminate” (Martin 1993: 92). 
Recent projects tried to tackle these shortcomings by specifying both the independent 
and the dependent variables. Most noteworthy in this regard is the rational design 
project of international institutions (Koremenos/Lipson/Snidal 2001a, 2001b). 
Concerning the independent variable, the project focuses on distribution problems, 
enforcement problems, the number of actors involved, and the level of uncertainty. 
With respect to the dependent variable, the project differentiates between five 
dimensions of form, thus allowing the test of 16 conjectures about the relationship 
between specific cooperation problems and institutional solutions.  
The establishment of a clear-cut relationship between differently formed institutions 
and their effectiveness has been equally troublesome. Clive Archer’s (2001) seminal 
study on IOs only comes to very general and ad hoc conclusions. The rational design 
project yields ambivalent evidence, too. Nevertheless, the basic approach of 
establishing a relationship between social situation, institutional form and 
effectiveness is highly relevant and guides a whole range of projects on security 
institutions. 
 
 
1.3. Analyzing Regional Security Institutions 
 
At the end of the 1990s, approximately 30 regional security institutions were in 
existence (Schiavone 2005; for a list see appendix). In addition to their external 
function of expressing a common regional identity and a common position of their 
members, regional security institutions perform the internal task of managing rivalries 
among members. In many cases, member states regard the task of internal risk 
management as more important than the provision of security against external foes 
(Weitsman 2004).  
Comparative studies of security institutions typically follow the above-mentioned 
approach. They conceptualize “form” both as dependent and as independent variable 
(Keohane 1989: 15; Wallander, Haftendorn and Keohane 1999: 7; Wallander 2000). 
According to Haftendorn (1997), dimensions of form include membership, rules of 
decision-making, behavioral rules (norms and values), instruments, and the internal 
distribution of power.4 Concerning the social environment, Haftendorn distinguishes 
                                                 
4 It is disputable whether the internal distribution of power is part of the institutional form or part of 
the social situation, as other studies imply.  
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between collaboration and coordination games. On a more concrete level, she 
differentiates between external deterrence, internal security, and reassurance against 
unknown dangers. However, Haftendorn and her collaborators, too, have encountered 
insurmountable difficulties in establishing a clear-cut relationship between function 
and form. In the summary of their reader, Keck (1997b: 264) acknowledges that 
“concrete security institutions like NATO or the OSCE are complex entities which 
deal with numerous and related cooperation problems”. The relationship between 
functions and forms of concrete security institutions is obviously more complicated 
than abstract models seem to suggest. Other case studies, too, are unable to draw 
generalized conclusions from their cases (Keohane/Haftendorn/Wallander 1999) or 
introduce intervening variables in order to explain the relationship between function 
and institutional form (Weber 1992). 
The relationship between the form of institutions and their effectiveness is even less 
explicit. Haftendorn (1997: 25) acknowledges this point when she summarizes that 
little attention has been paid to the effects of differently formed security institutions. 
She is inclined to pay tribute to the classical conjecture that the effectiveness of an 
institution depends on the level of institutionalization. However, when looking at the 
panoply of her cases, she admits that, in order to explain the whole picture, additional 
factors, like the interests and preferences of member states, as well as the role of ideas 
and cultural configurations, need to be taken into account (Haftendorn 1997: 24).  
Among the few quantitative studies on regional security institutions, the analyses by 
Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom (2004) as well as Pevehouse and Russett (2006) 
deserve special attention. The former study differentiates international institutions 
according to three dimensions of form: mandate, strength of the institutional structure, 
and level of contention among members. In accordance with the above-mentioned 
quantitative research, the authors find no strong relationship between IO membership 
as such and member states’ conflict behavior. However, their tests of differently 
formed subgroups of IOs yield interesting results. Apparently, institutionalization is 
the most decisive dimension of form. Membership in highly institutionalized IOs 
correlates significantly with lower levels of conflict involvement. Especially the 
combination of high institutionalization and low levels of contention significantly 
reduces the likelihood of conflict. Pevehouse and Russett correlate the democratic 
character of IOs with their effectiveness and find convincing evidence that 
interdemocratic IOs contribute significantly to peace among their members. Less 
convincing than these statistical findings are the attempts of both studies to construct a 
causal relationship between institutional form and effectiveness. 
To summarize, neither is the relationship between function and form of institutions 
well established, nor do we know how the form of institutions influences their 
effectiveness. Comparing the results of the available studies is complicated because 
they use different measures of effectiveness and different conceptions of institutional 
form. Some also lack a clear theoretical understanding of the causal relationship 
between form and conflict behavior. Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom’s work is 
outstanding insofar as it operationalizes its variables and provides an explicit 
theoretical understanding on how differently shaped institutions might affect the 
conflict behavior of their member states. However, even their finding of a statistically 
significant relationship between membership in highly institutionalized IOs and peace 
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is not unequivocal, since one of their control variables – democracy – has an almost 
equally strong impact on absence of MID involvement.  
These findings as well as the Pevehouse/Russett study raise an interesting point. It 
alludes to the possibility that the form of an institution might not only be shaped by its 
function, but also by the domestic structure of its members.  
 
 
1.4. Opening the Black-box of the Member States 
 
The traditional view of international organizations has been state centric (for an early 
exception see Zürn 1993). According to this view, IOs are composed of states as 
unitary, rational actors in pursuit of similar goals. Given this perspective, attempts to 
trace variation in effectiveness and form back to member-state’s properties have 
appeared utterly fruitless. This ignorance of domestic variables is part of the heritage 
of the early neo-institutionalist strategy, which tried to challenge realism by showing 
that cooperation is possible even if one accepts basic premises of realist thinking 
(Martin/Simmons 1999: 98). Although opening up the institutional debate to second 
image variables has been considered one of the most promising directions for future 
research (Milner 1997), the community has just begun to dent the bastion of state-
centric thinking in this area. This neglect is all the more surprising since a liberal 
approach to international organizations could benefit from work in the adjacent fields 
of transgovernmental and transnational theories.  
So far, work building on Robert Putnam’s notion of Two-Level-Games is still 
regarded as one of the major liberal advancements in the area of studies on 
international organizations (Putnam/Evans 1993; Zangl 1999). Putnam (1988) points 
out that inter-state negotiations have both an international and a domestic dimension. 
Successful negotiations depend on a consensus among the participating states as well 
as the accordance of winning coalitions of domestic actors within each state. More 
interestingly, Putnam assumes that chief executives monopolize, and hence are able to 
manipulate, the flow of information between the domestic and the international level. 
Following Putnam, Andrew Moravcsik (1993) has complemented neo-institutionalist 
research with a liberal dimension by explicitly incorporating the domestic process of 
preference formation into his model of interstate bargaining within institutions. 
However, his liberal-institutionalism, too, shares basic premises of state-centric 
thinking, like the assumptions that the process of preference formation takes place 
within the closed container of the nation state and that chief executives are the sole 
representatives on the international stage. 
Both assumptions are challenged by transgovernmental and transnational approaches 
(compare Pollack/Shaffer 2001). Transgovernmental approaches were advanced by 
Keohane and Nye in the early 1970s. They define transgovernmental networks as „sets 
of direct interactions among sub-units of different governments that are not controlled 
or closely guided by the politics of the cabinets or chief executives of those 
governments“ (Keohane/Nye 1974: 43). According to them, transgovernmentalism 
rises with the complexity of politics as well as with the level of interdependence. 
Furthermore, they assert that transgovernmentalism flourishes around IOs, which may 
offer themselves as forums for the regular interaction of national bureaucrats, or which 
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may actively contribute to transgovernmental networks. In the 1990s, 
transgovernmental approaches experienced a revival within the area of EU studies 
(Wessels 1992). By now, research on the EU has identified close interaction of 
sectorally oriented governmental sub-units as one of the hallmarks of the EU.  
Most observers maintain that the institutionalized coordination among national 
bureaucracies follows functional necessities. According to this view, the EU is 
spearheading developments which are taking place or will take place within other 
regional organizations as well. For example, Ann-Marie Slaughter maintains that, as a 
result of the growing complexity and interdependence of the post-Cold War world, 
states are disaggregating into separate, functionally distinct parts. Functional state 
bureaucracies then create networks among each other, establishing a sectorally based 
transgovernmental order (Slaughther 2004, 18). The debate within Western Europe on 
the future of the state reached similar conclusions. For example, Marin/Mayntz (1991: 
17) argued that, due to increasing complexities and informational deficits, the notion 
of the central state has become a fiction. Instead, we are witnessing the emergence of a 
centerless society and the disaggregation of the state into a set of sectorally oriented 
and specialized agencies, which are only connected through weak couplings (compare 
Freund/Rittberger 2001). 
Transnational approaches advance a similar argument. Early notions defined 
transnational relations as all kinds of cross border interaction involving at least one 
non-state actor (Keohane/Nye 1972). They treated this phenomenon as a residual 
category, growing in magnitude but of unclear importance. Under the guise of the term 
governance, by now, transnational approaches are in full swing. Although the term is 
still ill defined, most contributions perceive transnational governance as regular, 
intentional and non-hierarchical interactions across borders among private and public 
actors aiming at the solution of common problems (Blumenthal 2005). Again, IOs are 
regarded as a focal point for transnational activities. Most contributions to this debate 
trace the emergence of governance structures back to growing interdependence and 
complexity on the one hand, and a reduced problem-solving capacity on the state on 
the other hand. Hence, it is widely assumed that transnational governance structures 
are evenly distributed over the globe and that all IOs are affected in a similar way. In 
fact, the UN system is regarded as one of the most important locations for 
transnational governance activities. 
On the following pages, we build on transgovernmental and transnational insights in 
order to construct institutional form characteristics as building blocks for a liberal 
approach to IOs. We argue that interdemocratic institutions , i.e. institutions composed 
of democracies, differ from traditional institutions with regard to the density and depth 
of transgovernmental and transnational links to member states and that these links are 
relevant to their ability to contain conflicts and foster cooperation among member 
states. Thus, we take issue with both the proposition of two-level games: first, that 
chiefs of executive control the flow of information between the international and the 
domestic arena, and second, with the notion that the phenomenon of 
transgovernmentalism and transnationalism is triggered solely by functional pressures 
and is thus uniformly distributed. Instead, we argue that democracies are more prone 
to develop transgovernmental and transnational links, while autocratic leaders tend to 
control their societies and political systems. Consequently, we assume that 
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interdemocratic institutions are characterized by multiple links between different 
branches and levels of government, creating a deep communicative arena. 
Furthermore, we assume that interdemocratic institutions are deeply embedded in 
networks of societal contacts among their member states. In contrast, we assume that 
traditional IOs are characterized by intergovernmental structures.  
We proceed from the basic premises of the rational institutional choice approach. We 
conceptualize form as both dependent and independent variable. In contrast to rational 
choice approaches, we advance the notion that the form of an institution is not only 
intentionally designed according to the cost-benefit structure of its founding members, 
but is also influenced by their domestic structure and develops over time. We argue 
that interdemocratic security institutions, even if they start out as purely 
intergovernmental enterprises, develop special form characteristics distinguishing 
them from traditional institutions. Furthermore, we argue that this form explains their 
extraordinary effectiveness in securing peace among their members. The bifurcated 
nature of the democratic peace may thus not be the result of a combination of state 
properties, but should be conceptualized as an interaction phenomenon. In this vein, 
we assert that interdemocratic institutions are a key to the understanding of the 
democratic peace (Hasenclever 2002a; Dembinski/Hasenclever/ Wagner 2004).  
Before we develop our understanding of institutional form further, it is therefore 
imperative that we present our theoretical understanding on how international 
institutions might be able to prevent the onset of war and foster cooperation. 
 
 
1.5. International Institutions and the Prevention of War  
 
Rational theories on war have identified private information, that is, the absence of 
information on the military capabilities and resolve of the other side, as the single most 
important cause of war (Fearon 1995; for an empirical corroboration see 
Bearce/Flanagan/Floros 2006). Moreover, studies of war have discovered three crucial 
pathways for the escalation of conflicts. Firstly, the risk of war increases if states 
perceive each other as power rivals and if they fear that the tide might turn against 
them. Secondly, the risk of war is further exacerbated if states take recourse to 
unilateral strategies and bullying tactics. Thirdly, the risk of war increases if the 
relationship between states becomes polarized, that is if the interactions on every 
policy field converge into one big confrontational attitude (Hasenclever 2002b; 
Dembinski/Hasenclever/Wagner 2004).  
International organizations reduce these risks. Firstly, they may provide reliable 
information on military capabilities, resolve and strategic intentions of the opponent 
(Keohane/Haftendorn/Wallander 1999: 330). Secondly, they may allow states to 
credibly communicate their foreign policy interests and longer-term intentions, thus 
increasing the chance of cooperation and making the resort to unilateral strategies less 
attractive. Thirdly, they may prevent the polarization of a relationship by creating 
robust boundaries between policy fields (Rittberger/Zürn 1990).  
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2. Domestic Structure and Form of International Institutions - A new Approach 
to the Study of International Organizations 
 
a) Embeddedness: This form characteristic denotes the way in which international 
institutions are connected with societal actors and legislatives within their member 
states. We argue that democratic states are less able to control societal actors and their 
transnational contacts. In addition, parliaments may infringe on the executive 
dominance of foreign policy. As competences are shifted from the national level to 
international institutions, private actors and legislators are seeking access to 
international institutions. Vice versa, supranational organs as well as state 
representatives serving at IOs actively seek contacts with societal and legislative 
actors, thus creating dense networks between the international and the national level of 
governance (for a similar account see Rittberger 1973b: 49ff).5 The embeddedness of 
intergovernmental cooperation within networks of societal actors affects the 
institutional effectiveness in two ways: Firstly, it increases the level of reliable 
information on member states’ capabilities, behavior, preferences, and intentions. 
Secondly, the institutionalization of transnational contacts between private and 
legislative actors along sectoral lines furthers the autonomy of policy sectors and 
hinders attempts to re-aggregate the unitary state (Leeds 1999: 986).  
b) Communicative arena: This form characteristic denotes the communicative patterns 
among governmental actors within an institution. We maintain that in democracies, 
central governments are less able and less inclined to monopolize and control contacts 
of governmental sub-units across borders. Instead, we hypothesize that among 
democracies, specialized sub-units of governments form transgovernmental networks 
through which additional information of a specific quality is being relayed. Quality 
refers both to the authenticity of information as well as to the amount of information 
shared at the different stages of the policy cycle. The authenticity of information is 
ensured by the personal trust and the esprit de corps which develops within semi-
permanent transgovernmental networks. The concept of the policy cycle indicates that 
decision-making processes run through different stages, starting with the gathering and 
analysis of information on external developments, the formation of national 
preferences, the national decision-making, international coordination, implementation 
of policy decision, and evaluation (Kingdon 1984). Most conceptions of International 
Relations explicitly or implicitly assume that the first three steps of the policy cycle 
take place within the container of the nation-state and that states begin to interact only 
after national decisions have been taken (Moravcsik 1993). In contrast, we argue that 
in interdemocratic institutions, the early stages of the policy process are also affected 
by the institution. Specialized sub-units of government are occupied with the 
assessment of developments and the formulation of policy alternatives. As those semi-
independent sub-units form additional communicative nodes, chances increase that 
                                                 
5 Our concept of embeddedness has some similarities with Karl Deutsch’s notion of security 
communities (Deutsch 1961), but differs from Deutsch’s work in two respects: Firstly, we are 
interested in the institutional consequences of transnational communicative patterns. Secondly, we 
argue that transnational communicative patterns as such do not generate peaceful effect. Rather, it is 
the societal embeddedness of intergovernmental cooperation within institutions which generates 
additional information relevant for security and which contributed to the autonomy of policy fields. 
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information regarding the early phases of the policy-cycle is exchanged. Since this 
kind of information is valuable, we expect that in interdemocratic institutions 
spontaneous exchanges give rise to routines and norms which will then express 
themselves in a specific institutional form. In addition, we assume that 
transgovernmental networks of functional sub-units of governments create distinct 
regulatory systems, and thus consolidate the autonomy of policy fields. 
 
 
3. Case Selection and Operationalization of Institutional Form 
 
3.1. Case Selection 
 
In the following chapters, we will describe both the embeddedness and the 
communicative arena of five regional security institutions located on three continents. 
We have chosen NATO and the EU, the OAS and Mercosur, and ASEAN. These 
institutions are similar with regard to their tasks and objectives. They are multi-
purpose organizations providing external as well as internal security functions for their 
members. In addition, alone or in conjunction with sister or off-spring institutions, 
they promote economic cooperation. These five organizations differ with regard to 
their membership and with regard to their effectiveness. The European Union and 
NATO are two interdemocratic security institutions. With the treaty of Rome, the 
European Economic Community (EEC) started out as an institution focusing on 
economic cooperation, but began to perform security tasks for its members since the 
1970s. NATO, originally designed to guarantee the external security of its members, 
has also continuously been involved in their internal security relations. The extensive 
body of literature on European security agrees that both NATO and the EU have 
contributed heavily to peace and stability in the formerly war-torn European region.  
The OAS is a case of an institution that has changed enormously due to the 
democratization of all member states. It was designed as a system of collective 
security. During the Cold War when most of its members were autocratic, it proved 
unable to respond to the ongoing conflicts in Latin America. However, starting with 
the processes of (re-)democratization in Latin America, its mechanisms were 
reactivated and the necessary conditions were created to turn it into a more efficient 
security institution. Many observers testify that in recent years the OAS has indeed 
become more successful in managing conflicts in the Western hemisphere. Mercosur 
was founded by the newly democratic states in the Southern Cone. The primary 
motivation for collaboration was the Brazilian and Argentinean desire to establish 
sustainable democracies and to resolve their economic problems. However, one of the 
prerequisites for stable cooperation was the ending of their strategic rivalries. The 
defense cooperation in the Southern Cone can therefore be considered a byproduct of 
economic cooperation (Alcañiz 2005). Although Mercosur’s original rationale is 
economic integration, it has inspired further collaboration between member states and 
associates in the defense and security sector. Meanwhile, a ‘political security network’ 
is being built up along with the Common Market (Schiavone 2005: 230). 
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ASEAN is a heterologous institution. Its main goal originally became the maintenance 
of peace and stability within the Southeast Asian region. Economic development 
emerged as a secondary aim. While the economies in Southeast Asia indeed flourished 
well until the Asian crisis, observers agree that cooperation in the field of security has 
never really taken off. During the Asian crisis, even economic cooperation turned 
more or less dysfunctional. Since then, especially its more democratic member states 
have recognized the need for institutional changes and reforms in order to increase its 
effectiveness as a security institution and are trying to push this agenda. 
 
 
3.2. Form Characteristic I: Embeddedness  
 
We assume that the embeddedness of security institutions depends on three crucial 
factors. Firstly, it depends on the density of transnational communicative channels or 
agents connecting international organizations with the societies and political systems 
of their member states. Communicative channels may consist of a) interest groups, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and epistemic communities, b) the media, c) 
parliamentary networks or associations. Those communicative agents circulate 
information on the policy of the institution and the behavior of executives on the 
international level to their domestic audiences as well as information concerning 
compliance and preferences of political actors within the member states to the 
international institution and to other member states. The interplay between interest 
groups, epistemic communities and the media is particularly important. NGOs do not 
only inform their constituencies directly via newsletters or other communicative 
devices about the policy of international institutions and lobby IOs on behalf of their 
constituencies. Together with epistemic communities they also create sectoral 
transnational public (expert) spaces where the policy of international institutions and 
the behavior of national executives within institutions are scrutinized and can be 
criticized. The media links these sectoral transnational public (expert) spaces with the 
fully developed national public spaces of member states, thereby contributing to the 
transparency of international institutions. Parliamentary networks and assemblies 
fulfill similar functions. On the one hand, they provide parliaments independently with 
information on the inner working of IOs. On the other hand, they pass on information 
concerning the preferences of domestic public actors directly to the institution and to 
other member states.  
The density of communicative channels may be measured in terms of the number of 
NGOs and interest groups providing input to and reporting on the institution, the size 
of epistemic communities covering the activities of the institution, the number of 
international media correspondents at the location of the IO headquarters, the number 
of specialized publications covering the institution, the presence and activities of 
parliamentary networks and assemblies, and the amount of civil servants working with 
the institution. 
Secondly, the embeddedness of institutions depends on the interface of those above-
mentioned communicative agents with the security institution. Communicative agents 
can only relay information from and to the institution if the institution itself is open 
and accessible. This interface consists of access points as well as outreach activities of 
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the institution. To assess the quality of the interface we ask whether and how the 
institution consults with interest groups and the NGO community, whether the 
institution grants access rights to interest groups, media representatives, and 
parliamentarians, whether the institution maintains a public relations department, how 
much of the institution’s resources go into public relations, whether the institution 
maintains outreach programs, and works with NGOs and interest groups in 
implementing policy.  
A third element of embeddedness concerns the information generating, processing and 
disseminating functions of the institution. Although this function is closely related to 
the second dimension, we list it separately because it involves a crucial activity 
performed by the institution itself (Mitchell 1998). We assess the quality of the 
information gathering, processing and disseminating function by asking not only 
whether the secretariat or other organs of the institution are actively engaged in 
collecting information from member states, but also whether they are entrusted with 
checking the validity of the information provided.  
 
 
3.3. Form Characteristic II: Communicative Arena  
 
Assessing the communicative arena of an institution is a challenging task since arena 
is a rather abstract notion and hence difficult to observe. An assessment of the width 
and depth of an IO’s arena could either rely on the use of proxies – i.e. observable 
variables which allow inferences concerning the unobservable dimension ‘arena’ – or 
could rely on case studies and accounts of political actors. We use both strategies. On 
the one hand, we employ two proxies, which might shed some light on the scope of the 
arena. Firstly, we analyze relevant norms by asking whether key documents contain 
the obligation to consult prior to the adoption of fixed national positions. Secondly, we 
try to assess the practice of consultation by analyzing the decision-making structure of 
the institution. Here we assume that the density of contacts at different bureaucratic 
levels indicates whether an exchange of information concerning the early decision-
making stages does indeed take place. In addition, we ask:  
• whether member states maintain permanent representations at the headquarters of 
the institution, how large those representations are and what kind of functions they 
perform;  
• how the process of decision-making is organized, what kind of bodies are 
responsible for the preparation and implementation of decisions, and how often 
those bodies meet; 
• whether and what kind of operational devices or procedures for the communication 
between member states exist. 
Finally, we also scan the existing body of first-hand accounts and secondary literature 
on our institutions and summarize their findings concerning the scope of the 
communicative arena.  
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4. Comparing the Embeddedness of Regional Security Institutions 
 
Drawing on our theoretical assumptions we expect that the embeddedness of these 
institutions varies with their members’ level of democracy. We expect that NATO and 
the EU, although they differ with regard to their scope, membership and the degree of 
pooling and delegation, are comparably embedded in networks of societal and 
parliamentary actors. In the same vein, we expect that the embeddedness of the Latin 
American and Southeast Asian institutions increases as their members turn more 
democratic. 
 
 
4.1. Communicative Channels 
 
NATO and the EU are linked through a dense network of transnational and trans-
governmental contacts with their member states’ societies. NGOs, interest groups, the 
media, epistemic communities, parliamentarians and public servants channel 
information between the international and the domestic level. Next to Washington, 
Brussels is regarded as the city with the highest density of media offices and 
representations of societal interests, ranging from industry, associations of professions, 
employer and labor groups all the way to public interest groups and NGOs of different 
colors (Greenwood 2003). It is estimated that up to 15,000 representatives of societal 
interest groups are present in Brussels.6 Most of them focus on the economic and 
social policy of the European Union (Greenwood 2003). Since the mid- 1990s, 
however, an increasing number of non-profit NGOs and other interest groups focusing 
on foreign and security policy has been flocking to Brussels to influence both NATO 
and the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU.7  
The landscape of NGOs engaged in the area of security and defense policy consists 
both of umbrella organizations or networks like the European Network for Civil Peace 
Services, and of individual organizations like the International Crisis Group, whose 
110 staffers are working in five continents. Some of the latter, like Greenpeace, are 
multinational in character, others, like the British-American Security Information 
Council (BASIC), are national entities. Some organizations are highly professional 
NGOs/think tanks, whereas others have preserved their grass roots character. Most 
influential is the European Peacebuilding Liasion Office (EPLO), which was founded 
in 1991 by 17 NGOs. EPLO as well as some of its members, like the International 
Security Information Service Europe (ISIS-Europe), maintain a permanent presence in 
Brussels and provide a continuous input to the European and NATO policy process. 
Others, like the British NGO/think tank Saferworld, accompany the European policy 
process from their home base. Although, in general, distance can be a disadvantage, 
Saferworld has had a major impact on the EU’s security policy in areas like export 
controls.  
                                                 
6 Better Regulation Task Force: Get Connected. Effective Engagement in the EU, September 2005. 
The European Public Affairs Directory lists approximately 2,000 interest organizations. Greenwood 
(2003) estimates that approximately 1,500 interest groups are present at the European level.  
7 By the beginning of this millennium, producer interests, associations of professions and employers 
still account for app. 80% of all interest representations (Fligstein/Stone Sweet 2001; Pfeifer 1995). 
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Table 1: Major peace-building NGOs and umbrella organizations working on 
EU/NATO 
 
In the case of NATO, the family of the Atlantic Treaty Associations (ATA) is worth 
mentioning as an additional link connecting the Alliance with its member states. On 
the one hand, the national ATA organizations inform their national publics on 
NATO’s policy and on transatlantic security issues. They organize lectures, seminars 
and visits to NATO’s headquarters for parliamentarians, researchers, and journalists. 
In addition, some of them support research and publish series or individual papers on 
transatlantic security issues. On the other hand, through meetings, international 
conferences, and study tours for legislators or journalists from other NATO-states, 
they promote understanding abroad for their national foreign and security policy.  
Epistemic communities consisting of research and consultancy institutions supplement 
the transnational networks, connecting Western societies with NATO and the EU. To 
highlight just some nodes and activities of these networks: The family of foreign 
policy research institutes (Clingendael, DGAP, IAI, IFRI, RIIA, etc.) fosters exchange 
and collaboration among scientific “EU- and NATO watchers” and among scientists 
and national officials as well as NATO and EU representatives, respectively. 
Especially noteworthy in this regard are the annual high-level NATO conferences 
organized by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP, German Institute for 
International and Security Affairs), the annual Munich Conference on Security Policy 
and similar events in other European countries. The Institute for Security Studies 
(ISS), an autonomous agency of the EU, as well as a couple of Brussels-based 
institutions like the Security & Defense Agenda stimulate strategic discussion among 
European research institutes and serve as a bridge between the professional knowledge 
based in these institutes and relevant European bodies. 
With regard to the armaments industry, another major societal actor in the area of 
foreign and security policy, two observations are relevant. Firstly, due to functional 
Name Number of 
Members/  
Local Groups 
Number of 
Staffers 
Headquarters 
European Peacebuilding 
Liason Office (EPLO) 
20 3 Brussels 
European Network for Civil 
Peace Services 
  no headquarters 
European Platform for 
Conflict Prevention and 
Transformation 
150 local groups 4 Utrecht 
International Acton Network 
on Small Arms/European 
Section 
58 2 London/Brussels 
Greenpeace/European Section   Brussels 
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pressure and political tutelage, the national European and American arms industries 
have established close transnational contacts. Secondly, although the nation-state is 
still the major reference point for the armament industry, large firms and associations 
of smaller enterprises are increasingly turning their attention both to NATO and the 
EU. Multinational companies like the European Aeronautic Defence and Space 
Company (EADS) and major national firms like Thales maintain representations in 
Brussels. In addition, the Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe 
(ASD), a major interest group that has superseded three smaller lobby organizations, 
provides input into the European and transatlantic decision-making process. 
As mentioned above, the media represents a crucial link connecting the national public 
spheres with the transnational and intergovernmental level. A couple of specialized 
journals report on NATO and the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. ‘NATO 
or EU friendly’ publications like NATO Review or Europäische Sicherheit as well as 
neutral news services like Atlantic News are among them. Some national journals like 
the Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift (ÖMZ) contain regular columns on NATO 
affairs. In addition, the Brussels-based press corps, consisting of over 500 press 
offices, reports on NATO and EU security policy.  
Networks of parliamentarians make up the third dimension of the communicative 
channels. In the case of NATO, the most important network is the Parliamentary 
Assembly (PA). The PA brings together approximately 300 parliamentarians from 
NATO states and partner countries – most of them members of the defense committees 
of their parliaments - twice a year to discuss transatlantic security issues. Its principal 
objective is to foster mutual understanding among Alliance parliamentarians of the key 
security challenges NATO is facing. On the one hand, the PA provides NATO and its 
member governments with an indication of collective parliamentary opinion. On the 
other hand, it contributes to greater transparency of NATO policies, and thereby 
advances the possibility of national parliaments to hold executives accountable.  
In the case of the EU, the European Parliament (EP) accompanies and scrutinizes the 
policy of the European Commission and the Council of the European Union. Although 
the EP possesses markedly less competence in the second pillar, as compared to the 
first pillar, it is nevertheless able to question European decision-makers, to report on 
EU foreign policy-making, and to influence foreign policy via its first pillar 
competence and its budgetary power.  
In the OAS as well as in Mercosur, it is clearly visible that transnational contacts have 
been expanding in the course of democratization processes in the region. Although, in 
comparison with NATO and the EU, the density of communicative channels between 
both Latin American organizations and societal actors is still low, civil society 
meetings are organized more regularly, for example preceding the Summits of the 
Americas or the meetings of the OAS General Assembly.  
The hemisphere’s largest network of civil society organizations is the Red 
Interamericana para la Democracia (RID, Inter-American Democracy Network), 
founded in 1994 and comprising more than 350 member organizations in 24 countries. 
Its main task is the support of the democratization process in Latin America and the 
promotion of citizen participation. In this context, it also advocates the participation of 
civil society organizations in hemispheric processes, such as the Summits of the 
Americas and the General Assembly of the OAS. As far as civic engagement in the 
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defense and security sector is concerned, the Red de Seguridad y Defensa de América 
Latina (RESDAL, Network for Security and Defense in Latin America), formed in 
2001, is an important advancement towards democratic governance and greater 
transparency of defense issues. 
During the 1990s, it has become more common for social science research, also in the 
area of international relations, security and defense studies, to carry out joint projects 
with research institutions from several countries. The Latin American Faculty of 
Social Sciences (FLACSO) is to the present the largest research institute in the social 
sciences in Latin America. FLACSO Chile, in particular, has traditionally been very 
active in developing and coordinating regional research on international security, 
strategic studies and civil-military relations. There are several other research networks 
that focus, among other issues, on regional integration and hemispheric security.  
Most of the larger civil society networks and epistemic communities are accredited to 
the OAS or have at least participated in OAS events. Although the possibilities of 
these organizations to express themselves within the OAS are quite limited, at least if 
compared to Western European NGOs, they are growing. Not only the General 
Assembly, where civil society participation is most visible in the context of its annual 
meetings, but also the Permanent Council and the Committee on Hemispheric Security 
as one of its important sub-units are consulting with experts from academia and 
experienced civil society associations.  
In connection with Mercosur, there are a number of interest groups pushing forward 
civil society participation, though most of them, like the initiative Somos Mercosur 
(We are Mercosur) or the Instituto Mercosur Social (IMS), concentrate on social 
policy topics and the negative consequences of economic globalization (Grugel 2005, 
2006). 
In the field of international and defense politics, according to the Yearbook of 
International Organizations, the only mentionable special relationship that Mercosur 
maintains is with the Institute of International Studies of the University of Chile. 
However, some influential academic institutions in Mercosur member countries 
dealing with issues of regional integration and security cooperation are in the process 
of building up international collaboration, and are beginning to constitute important 
parts of second track diplomacy: Their academic fora and conferences frequently bring 
together academics, politicians, diplomats, and entrepreneurs. Since most of them are 
privately funded, they are independent from the national governments. Among these 
group of rather young institutes, the Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones 
Internacionales (CARI, Argentine Council of International Relations) the Centro 
Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (CEBRI, Brazilian Center for International 
Relations), as well as the Argentine NGO Seguridad Estratégica en el 2000 (Ser en el 
2000, Strategic Security in the Year 2000) are worth mentioning.  
Compared to the transatlantic region, the development of transnational links between 
civil society organizations is retarded in Latin America, which stems from the fact that 
democratization processes are still rather recent phenomena throughout the region. 
Although the situation has been changing quickly during the last years and many new 
organizations have emerged, their lasting impact and ability to take effect on the 
international level cannot be definitively gauged yet (Ugarte 2004; Jácome/Milet/ 
Serbin 2005). Within the framework of transition from military regime to democracy, 
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a lot of emphasis was placed on issues linked to security and defense policies, civil 
control and the role of the armed forces. However, along the path of democratic 
consolidation, these issues faded into the background. Additionally, due to the rise of 
crime and violence in the region, the most pressing concerns associated with the term 
“security” have shifted to public safety (Jácome/Milet/Serbin 2005; ECCP & CRIES 
2003: 192-195). 
In contrast to the Western security institutions like the EU and NATO, there are 
neither media representatives nor specialist publications focusing exclusively on the 
OAS or Mercosur. However, the two organizations and problems of hemispherical and 
sub-regional integration and cooperation are increasingly dealt with in policy papers 
and academic journals. Media attention peaks during the annual General Assembly 
meetings as well as the Summits of the Americas, whereas the regular meetings and 
results of other OAS bodies are usually not covered. Major newspapers of the 
Southern Cone countries report rather frequently on Mercosur affairs, albeit with a 
bias towards frictions and trade disputes. However, there seems to be awareness of the 
problem of lack of communication and media presence. The Center of Formation for 
Regional Integration (CEFIR) started a program called “Fortification of the 
Communicative Capacity fostering the Integration Process in the Framework of 
Mercosur”, which consisted of seminars and workshops for regional journalists and 
opinion leaders.  
The oldest parliamentary network in the region is the Latin American Parliament 
(PARLATINO), which was founded in 1964 and is composed of members of 22 Latin 
American and the Caribbean national parliaments. However, it is not related to any 
regional organization. Since the 1990s, several initiatives have been launched on the 
hemispherical as well as the sub-regional level. In 1997, the Parliamentary 
Confederation of the Americas (COPA) was founded. In the framework of the 
Organization of American States, another initiative was started in this vein recently. 
The Inter-Parliamentary Forum of the Americas (FIPA) is an independent network 
made up of the national legislatures from OAS member countries. FIPA encourages 
the sharing of experiences and best practices amongst its members and works to 
strengthen the role of legislatures in democratic development. 
In Mercosur, the Joint Parliamentary Commission was established by the Protocol of 
Ouro Preto in 1994. It is composed of legislators from the four member countries, and 
its main aim is to assist in harmonization of legislation, as required by the integration 
process. Recently, it has been decided to transform it into a Mercosur Parliament, 
which will at first continue to be made up of legislators from the member states, but 
shall be directly elected by 2014. While this is an official Mercosur organ, giving the 
member states’ legislative chambers formal access to Mercosur’s decision-making 
procedures, the Unión de Parlamentarios del Mercosur (Parliamentary Union of 
Mercosur), founded in 1999 and based in Buenos Aires, is an intergovernmental 
organization composed of the national and provincial parliaments of all Mercosur 
member states. Its central goal is to encourage exchange and cooperation between the 
diverse legislative entities of the region.  
ASEAN presents a different picture; in contrast to the European and Latin American 
institutions, ASEAN activities remain largely intergovernmental – although this has 
been changing with developments after the Asian crisis (Caballero-Anthony 2005). At 
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the point of comparison (1997/98), ASEAN was an institution with mainly elite 
contacts and hardly any embeddedness into society. As most of the ASEAN member 
states had only weak, disempowered civil societies, societal influence was generally 
low (Yamamoto 1995). The national conditions of most member states impaired the 
development of transnational networks and the emergence of transnational contacts as 
it has been almost taken for granted in the European and North American context. All 
in all, therefore, ASEAN’s embeddedness into its member states’ societies and 
nongovernmental actors was not pronounced. Accordingly, the density of 
communicative channels between ASEAN and societal actors was low. 
Concerning foreign and security policy, the academic sector provided the only input 
from private or - to be more precise - semi-private actors (Higgott 1994). This input 
takes the form of second track diplomacy (Ball 1994; Kerr 1994; Rüland 2002a). 
Many of the regional research institutes around which this second track is organized 
have been governmentally sponsored and, hence, only rarely been independent. The 
second track comprises policy-oriented workshops, academic fora and conferences 
(Diamond/McDonald 1991; Davies/Kaufman 2002). What distinguishes track two 
diplomacy from purely academic conferences and workshops is its close connection to 
the first track, whether by the direct participation of politicians or the existence of 
communication channels between the two tracks (Kraft 2000).  
The network of ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-
ISIS), initialized in 1984, is the most frequented platform for research on foreign 
policy issues. ASEAN-ISIS comprises member institutes from almost all regional 
states, except Brunei and Laos. The Centre for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS) in Indonesia, for example, is part of the ISIS network. It is an explicit advocate 
of ASEAN regionalism and pursues an active exchange with politicians in order to 
influence their foreign policy decisions. The scholars of CSIS stress the importance of 
keeping in touch with civil society, with universities and other academic institutions in 
order to base their research on a broad foundation.8  
ASEAN-ISIS has produced a number of very well-known experts in security affairs 
and, more recently, regional economic development, who form the strong core of a 
regional epistemic community. The network has traditionally focused on improving 
regional cooperation and was also engaged in establishing the ASEAN regional forum 
(Caballero-Anthony 2005).  
Initially, the second track was an instrument of the states to separate difficult and 
controversial issues from official negotiations and to have them discussed without the 
risk for any participant to publicly lose his face. Recently, the character of the second 
track has slowly started to change, though. Some of the experts participating in these 
activities have also become involved in other political processes that bring them closer 
together with national and transnational civil society groups (Caballero-Anthony 
2005).  
Media relations constitute only a weak link between ASEAN and its members. As 
ASEAN decision-making processes, on the whole, have been quite opaque, journalists 
have not been granted insights into the institution’s politics. This lack of transparency 
is particularly distinct in security affairs. The consequence has been either an overly 
                                                 
8 Interviews with Bantarto Bandoro, C.P.F. Luhulima, Kusnanto Anggoro, and Rizal Sukma at CSIS in 
June 2006.  
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positive reporting by the media or, contrarily, a complete disinterest in ASEAN affairs. 
A specialized network of ASEAN journalism does not exist. Additionally, the lack of 
press freedom has been a major impediment in many member states; there are only 
few newspapers and press organs that are not under state control or threatened by 
censorship. In order to give balanced and fair accounts of ASEAN politics, journalist 
networks, such as the Southeast Asia Press Alliance have made efforts to educate 
regional journalists about ASEAN. By this, they aim at creating a new generation of 
free ASEAN reporting.  
Finally, ASEAN just like the other institutions discussed here, possesses a 
parliamentary organization:, ASEAN’s Inter-Parliamentary Organization (AIPO, 
founded in 1978) is a transnational network of parliamentarians from most ASEAN 
countries (except Brunei and Myanmar). Its main task is to communicate 
developments in the other member countries plus news from ASEAN to their 
respective parliamentary assemblies (Slaughter 2004: 111-12). Although some of its 
members would like the organization to be turned into an ASEAN parliament modeled 
on the European Parliament, AIPO is far from being anything but a discussion forum.9 
Originally designed as a body to enhance democratic participation of ASEAN people 
in ASEAN legislation, AIPO has not lived up to its goals yet. This, again, hinges on 
the low profile of many participating parliaments. It is hard to evaluate its 
communicative impact, however, which depends largely on the role that each 
parliament plays in its national setting.     
In the course of the last years, especially since the Asian crisis, ASEAN has started to 
reach out to its societies in order to enhance its own legitimacy. Alternative networks 
of NGOs that aim at forming a societal basis of ASEAN politics have developed. 
ASEAN-ISIS, for example, is the organizer of the annual colloquium on human rights 
that intends to establish a human rights mechanism within ASEAN, and it is also 
highly active in the ASEAN People’s Assembly (APA). Furthermore, most of the 
ASEAN-ISIS staffers are employed at national research institutes, and therefore 
concentrate their research not exclusively on regional affairs. Their expertise in issues 
such as democratization, economic development and national security also ensures 
their involvement in societal processes and, thus, potentially opens channels between 
national societies and the regional, institutional level. Connections to other non-state 
actors have increased within the last decade. Therefore, second track experts are in 
constant communication with other civil society actors and NGOs at these meetings 
and receive input from them. At the same time, they also publicly advertise ASEAN 
policies. For that reason, ASEAN-ISIS has the perspective to change its role from a 
classic track two instrument of ASEAN heads of government to a more autonomous 
mediator between the institution and societal interests. This dual function is new and 
has only just started to change the character of the second track (Job 2003). In 
ASEAN’s most recent development plan, the Vientiane Action Program (VAP), 
ranging from 2004 to 2010, a stronger role of second track agents, functioning as a tie 
between the institution and its member societies, is officially acknowledged as a 
mechanism to base ASEAN on a stronger societal foundation.  
                                                 
9 This was confirmed in an interview with Sjofjan Noor (AIPO Secretariat) and Warsiti Alfia 
(Regional Parliamentary Organisation at Indonesian Parliament) in June 2006 in Jakarta.  
  
 
21
Furthermore, the ASEAN People’s Assembly, a platform for regional and national 
nongovernmental and civil society groups, was formed in 2000 following the initiative 
of a few ASEAN governments and several research institutes. The assembly is 
intended to reach into the societies of ASEAN member states and therefore deals with 
issues that are of current importance in these states, such as the rights of indigenous 
peoples or social security. While to some observers the APA is the most promising 
approach towards reconciling ASEAN with the societies of its members, others claim 
that it is another elite project. Indeed, the most regular and active participants of the 
People’s Assembly have been academics, mostly members of think tanks which are 
involved in policy-making on the regional level anyway. The participation of NGOs 
and other societal groups still remains on a low level, so that, altogether, 
communicative channels between member states’ societies and the institution via 
society-based NGOs have only minimally developed, so far.  
To sum up: ASEAN remains divided over the relevance and desirability of closer 
transnational connections and maintains bodies and fora that are quasi-isomorphisms 
of the other institutions and have yet to be filled with content. In contrast, NATO and 
the European Union’s Security and Defense Policy are closely linked to their member 
states societies through numerous communicative channels and agents. Both major 
Western security institutions are embedded in a dense network of societal agents, 
parliamentarians, and public servants. The same holds increasingly true, although so 
far only to a much lesser degree, for OAS and Mercosur. On the one hand, societal 
actors contribute to the intergovernmental cooperation and provide additional 
information on national conditions. On the other hand, they scrutinize the 
intergovernmental cooperation and transmit their findings to their constituencies as 
well as via the media to the larger public. In effect, the participation of those agents 
creates transparency, reduces private information and contributes to accountability.  
 
 
4.2. Interface 
 
The two Western security institutions are not only open for cooperation with societal 
actors. The bodies of both institutions actively seek contacts with transnational public 
and civil societies of member states. Most importantly, they expect that interaction 
with societal actors will improve efficiency, increase legitimacy and strengthen their 
influence. Due to their different portfolios, the EU’s interface is more developed than 
NATO’s. However, even NATO is expanding contacts with societal actors.  
In the case of the European Union, the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) is the 
official interface between the EU and civil society (Morgan 1991). In practice, 
however, the ESC has been bypassed by direct links between private actors and EU 
organs. The European Commission has been the most important access point and 
partner for interest groups (Commission 2001a: 19). Most of the Directorates-General 
consult continuously and excessively through different mechanisms like open 
consultations, ad hoc meetings, consultative committees and institutionalized 
dialogues with private actors. At any given time, some 600 consultative committees 
are in existence.  
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The Commission regards the cooperation with civil society as being so important that 
it supports the presence of NGOs at the European level. Some Directorates-General 
have literally created European NGO networks in their respective fields in order to 
establish a counterweight to industry and to have additional societal interlocutors to 
consult with (Greenwood 2003: 189ff.). The Commission finances NGO projects and 
contributes – sometimes even heavily – to their core funding. According to its own 
estimation, NGO projects are sponsored with approximately one billion Euros 
annually (Commission 2000, 2; 13). Two thirds of these contributions are being spent 
in the area of foreign and security policy (Greenwood 2003). 
This active stance is motivated by a couple of concerns. The Commission expects that 
participation of societal actors will 
• improve the quality of its policy (Commission 2002a: 5), 
• facilitate the implementation of policy by reducing the costs of monitoring and the 
realization of policy initiatives (Héritier/Knill/Mingers 1996), 
• increase the chance that its policy initiatives are accepted by local actors 
(Commission 2001 b; 2002b: 4), 
• advance the emergence of a limited European public space on the level of 
associations (Commission 2001a), 
• provide legitimacy for its own policy. 
Although the European Parliament (EP) as an institution takes a more skeptical stance 
towards the activities of lobbying groups, individual Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs) are not only easily accessible, but also seek contacts with interest 
groups and civil society actors. The committees of the EP, too, rely heavily on outside 
expertise and input. As a result, interest groups of all kinds are able to channel their 
views into the parliamentary process. However, the resulting cacophony also means 
that most initiatives just drown in the flood of ongoing activities 
(Corbett/Jacobs/Shackleton 1995; Peterson/Shackleton 2002). In order to maximize 
their effectiveness, interest groups focus on two strategic access points. They try to 
engage the rapporteurs of the committees, who are responsible for pushing draft 
legislation through parliament. Additionally, they try to connect with the so-called 
inter-groups, i.e. groups of like-minded MEPs from different parties who have the 
ability to shape the agenda.  
The Council of the European Union is widely regarded as the least accessible of the 
three main EU-bodies because it represents the interests of states and only has a weak 
institutional structure. However, in the area of foreign and security policy, this 
assessment needs qualification. Firstly, the process of “Brusselization” (Howorth 
2001), that is the concentration of political activities in Brussels, is creating new 
access points. The newly established Political and Security Committee consists of 
Brussels-based representatives and is hence more accessible than the former Political 
Committee. In addition, the EU has established the position of a High Representative 
whose bureaucratic interests are furthered by establishing direct contacts with a 
European public. Secondly, even executives from member states have started to realize 
that the expert public opinion has an impact on their ability to prevail in the 
intergovernmental deliberations. Hence, talking to opinion leaders, NGOs, and experts 
has become the daily bread and butter even for Council members.  
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NATO’s interface consists of various access points and outreach programs. The 
alliance maintains a Public Diplomacy Division (PDD) equipped with 100 staffers, 
which is responsible for press and public relations as well as for contacts with societal 
actors in NATO member and partner states.  
The 15 staffers of the press and media section are responsible for dealing with the 
Brussels-based press corps. Approximately 400 journalists are accredited to NATO. 
Accredited journalists enjoy easier access to the NATO headquarters and receive 
invitations to weekly background briefings. NATO issues between 150 and 175 press 
releases per year. The second task of the press office consists of preparing and 
circulating daily press clippings which give the higher echelon of the NATO 
bureaucracy an overview on the debates within individual NATO-states.  
The NATO countries section of the PDD is in charge of some of NATO’s outreach 
activities. The staffers of the section organize visits by journalists, parliamentarians, 
researchers, and other opinion leaders to NATO’s headquarters. Each year, 
approximately 700 groups (20 000 people) visit both NATO and the Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). In addition, the section arranges 
speeches and public appearances of NATO’s leading political and military 
representatives in member states. The Secretary General alone gives between 50 and 
100 lectures per year. Another sphere of activity is the advancement of research and 
exchange on transatlantic security issues. NATO sponsors between five and eight 
major conferences in each member country per year. The Outreach Section of the PDD 
is responsible for similar activities in partner countries.  
NATO maintains a science program. In the framework of the program, NATO awards 
fellowships and supports the transnational cooperation of scientists, mostly in natural 
science. In recent years, the program has focused on supporting the collaboration of 
researchers from NATO and partner countries. Approximately 10,000 researchers 
participate in different functions in NATO’s science program.10 
Due to NATO’s restricted portfolio as a military alliance, cooperation with 
developmental and peace-building NGOs has traditionally not been one of NATO’s 
priorities. This, however, is changing as NATO takes on the task of stabilizing post-
conflict situations. Beginning in the late 1990s, NATO has been establishing working 
relations with this part of the NGO community on the theater level within its Civil-
Military Cooperation (CIMIC) programs. By now, this cooperation has evolved into a 
full-fledged and more or less formalized relationship. Cooperation with NGOs on the 
local level has triggered increased efforts at the international level as well. Discussions 
within NATO headquarters on an intensification and institutionalization of relations 
with the peace-building NGO community started two years ago, the United States, 
Britain and Denmark being the driving forces behind this new policy. So far, the North 
Atlantic Council (NAC) has encouraged various NATO divisions to intensify, where 
possible, their contacts with NGOs. The signing of memoranda of understanding with 
the International Organization of Migration (IOM) and the International Committee of 
the Red Cross are the first concrete manifestations of this change. In 2004, the NAC 
invited NGOs for a brain-storming on Afghanistan. In addition, the PDD as well as 
SHAPE are increasingly engaging the NGO community in conferences and seminars.  
                                                 
10 NATO Handbook 2001, p. 217. 
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As mentioned above, both NATO and the EU have developed close links with the 
European armament industry. In the case of NATO, these efforts date back to the 
1950s. After plans for the joint production of major items failed in the early 1960s, 
NATO members settled on a less centralized approach where states were encouraged 
to cooperate on a case-by-case basis. In this context, the Conference on National 
Armaments Directors (CNAD) was set up in 1966. Two years later, the CNAD 
established the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) as an industrial forum for 
the exchange of views on all aspects of armaments cooperation and as a link between 
national armament industries, NATO, and the CNAD.  
Within Europe, efforts towards closer armament cooperation can be traced back to the 
establishment of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) in 1976 
(Stewart 1991). By now, a whole panoply of organizations and forums, bringing 
together representatives of the European armament industry as well as of member 
states and the EU organs, tries to foster close armament cooperation (Schmitt 2003).  
Both OAS and Mercosur have, albeit to a different extent, developed possibilities of 
access for societal actors. Prior to 1999, there were no mechanisms that granted civil 
society organizations official status or provided them with access to the OAS and its 
decision-making bodies in a formalized manner. Permission to attend relevant 
meetings was granted on an ad hoc basis only. Prepared by a working group, two key 
initiatives were set in motion in 1999, namely the creation of a Committee on Civil 
Society Participation in OAS Activities11 as well as the approval of the “Guidelines for 
Participation by Civil Society Organizations in OAS Activities” (Permanent Council 
Resolution 759). This document outlines the scope of civil society participation in the 
organization’s activities and introduces the policy of accreditation. In order to further 
increase civil society participation, the “Strategies for Increasing and Strengthening 
Participation by Civil Society Organizations in OAS Activities” were adopted in 2003 
(Permanent Council Resolution 840). They especially aim at improving the 
information exchange between OAS bodies and civil society organizations, expanding 
participation opportunities and harmonizing processes and participation mechanisms in 
the different departments of the OAS (Cole 2003). 
Currently, there are three ways how NGOs can participate in the activities of the OAS 
(OAS 2005b: 18-23). First, an NGO can register to the OAS.  Registered organizations 
are granted the right to participate in public meetings of the OAS political bodies. 
Second, in case an NGO would like to participate without registering, it can still attend 
meetings of the General Assembly and specific conferences of the OAS. Third, an 
NGO can also enter into cooperation agreements with the General Secretariat or other 
OAS organs. As of February 2006, there are 127 formally registered organizations, six 
of which have their main thematic focus on peace building and security affairs. 
In recent years, the annual OAS General Assembly has been preceded by a dialogue 
between representatives of civil society and heads of member state delegations. In 
2003, the foreign ministers turned this type of exchange into a regular activity of the 
annual General Assembly session. More than 220 representatives of 133 
nongovernmental organizations participated in the session of the OAS General 
                                                 
11 The Committee on Civil Society Participation was formed only in 2001 and was subsequently 
merged with the Special Committee on Inter-American Summits Management, creating the Committee 
on Inter-American Summits Management and Civil Society Participation in OAS Activities. 
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Assembly in 2005. Several preparatory meetings which involved civil society 
organizations and academics were held in advance, leading to recommendations that 
were later submitted to the OAS headquarters and presented to foreign ministers and 
other delegates in a dialogue meeting. 
Increasingly, civil society organizations are not only granted access rights, but are also 
called upon as experts. This also applies to the defense and security sector. For this 
purpose, the General Secretariat maintains a roster of experts on confidence- and 
security-building measures, which is updated yearly on the basis of information 
provided by the member states and circulated to the member states. The Committee on 
Hemispheric Security holds an annual special meeting dedicated to the analysis of 
confidence- and security-building measures in the region. The participation of experts 
is considered as very helpful here. 
Although the integration mechanisms of Mercosur evidently have the potential to 
affect citizens in various policy fields, the ability of regional institutions to respond to 
civil society concerns is questionable. The Protocol of Ouro Preto, dated 1994, created 
two organs that are generally regarded as points of access for societal actors: the 
Comisión Parlamentaria Conjunta (CPC, Joint Parliamentary Commission), which is 
composed of legislators from the four countries, and the Foro Consultativo Económico 
y Social (FCES, Economic and Social Consultative Forum).  
The OAS maintains an extensive outreach program, for example by means of 
publications and press releases. The offices in charge are located in the Department of 
Communication and External Relations which belongs to the General Secretariat and 
contains, among others, the Office of External Relations and Resource Mobilization as 
well as the Office of Public Information. The mission of this latter body is to promote 
greater international awareness and understanding among diverse audiences of the 
decisions of OAS policy-making bodies and of the programs and work of the General 
Secretariat. As of February 2006, 18 staff members were explicitly mentioned on the 
website. In the same month, for example, 27 press releases were issued. Official OAS 
publications intended for a wider public include the Americas Magazine as well as the 
electronic magazine Americas Forum which is distributed monthly to more than 
45,000 subscribers, including government representatives, NGOs, research institutes 
and universities. A series of documentaries reports among other topics on OAS 
involvement in conflict resolutions and peace building processes. In addition to their 
publications, the Office of Public Information maintains a radio channel called Voice 
of the OAS.  
Mercosur, in turn, is less ambitious in its public relations endeavors. It releases its 
official gazette, the Boletín oficial del MERCOSUR, in Spanish and Portuguese four 
times a year. Mercosur’s Secretariat publishes an Annual Report as well as two series 
of more comprehensive technical reports and thematic documents related to subject 
matters of the regional integration process. Mercosur’s Macroeconomic Monitoring 
Group also provides a database containing fiscal indicators from the member states. 
The relations between societal actors and ASEAN are much more one-sided than those 
of the other four institutions. The interface between ASEAN and its communicative 
agents is partly secured via public relations and partly via (recent) attempts to include 
nongovernmental actors, such as the ASEAN University Network, the ASEAN 
Business Council or AIPO, into development initiatives. In the security sector, only 
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experts from research institutes have been able to establish regular exchanges with 
ASEAN representatives. The organization has made no systematic attempts to look for 
information exchange and input from non-state actors. Furthermore, no political 
consensus exists about the necessity and desirability of these actors’ participation in 
ASEAN politics. Officially, however, 58 nongovernmental organizations are affiliated 
with the institution. Although most of these ASEAN NGOs formally represent societal 
interests in member states, it is unclear to what extent they are actually linked with 
local interest groups.12 Moreover, the relationship between ASEAN and NGOs is 
unsystematic and consists mostly of ad hoc contacts. None of these groups belongs to 
the realm of security and foreign affairs. Although some approaches have been taken 
to include civil society actors and interest groups into policy-making, a state-centric 
perception of international politics, a strong accentuation of national sovereignty, and 
the non-democratic nature of many member states have gotten into the way of a 
consensus about cooperation with transnational non-state actors. 
ASEAN maintains a Press and Public Information Office as part of the Secretariat. It is 
closely linked to the Secretary General. In general, however, ASEAN’s public 
relations efforts have been rather erratic. The relevance of public relations work 
depends on the respective Secretary General, but it is not generally fixed how it should 
be conducted. Its financial means of about 3.5 percent of the entire budget 
demonstrates the low importance attached to public relations. Of the approximately 
150 employees at the Secretariat, eleven work at the public affairs office, mainly 
producing publications.  
The Secretary General is occasionally interviewed in regional newspapers and 
journals, and he regularly attends lectures and conferences with ASEAN-related 
agendas. He is the main representative of the organization towards the public, and he is 
also the main contact person for interested external parties. Thus, he functions as the 
most important access point for ASEAN-society relations. 
Where security affairs are concerned, ASEAN does not put much effort into reaching 
out to the public or giving media or societal representatives the opportunity to 
accompany its policies. Access points for foreign affairs have not been 
institutionalized. The ASEAN Regional Forum, which has no secretariat of its own, is 
even less present in media reporting and not at all connected with transnational 
societal actors. Moreover, occasional press reports tend to focus on summit meetings 
and their adorning karaoke events or other leisure activities of the participating 
politicians.  
In the economic sector, however, more effort is made to consult with interest groups. 
For instance, an ASEAN Business Advisory Council (BAC) has been founded. 
Moreover, ASEAN has announced its intention to involve the societies of its member 
states in the framework of its socio-cultural programs. Especially after the Bali summit 
in 2003 (for example in the Vientiane Action Program 2004), the relevance of an 
ASEAN linked with national societies has been underlined.  
To conclude: We have shown that the EU as well as NATO have developed close links 
with societal actors of their member states. The Latin American institutions have 
                                                 
12 In 2006, ASEAN decided to engage civil society groups more systematically and agreed on new 
guidelines for contacts of these groups with the secretariat and, eventually, the Standing Committee.  
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begun to develop connections with their publics. These findings contrast with the 
remarkable lack of interface in the case of ASEAN. 
 
 
4.3. Collection, Procession and Distribution of Information 
 
In the case of NATO, one of the most important information gathering and processing 
function concerns the so called Annual Reviews. In a first stage, member states 
develop a common force goal (Ministerial Guidelines), which is then broken down 
into force goals for each country (Draft Force Proposals). In the second stage, the 
commonly agreed force goals serve as a benchmark against which national efforts are 
measured. The evaluation takes place on the basis of Defense Planning Questionnaires 
(DPQ), detailed sets of questions, which are prepared and sent out to national 
Ministries of Defense (MDs) by the International Staff. From the replies to the DPQ, 
NATO’s staff prepares Draft Country Chapters. NATO representatives then visit each 
MD. Those “Trilaterals” represent in-depth evaluations of national defense planning. 
Member states are required to disclose their military capabilities, future force goals 
and armaments plans as well as their financial and industrial capacities. NATO experts 
provide an independent assessment of those data. Finalized Country Chapters are then 
adopted by the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) and form the basis of NATO’s 
Force Plan. Interestingly enough, NATO distributes the answers as well as the 
independent assessments to all other member-states, thus creating an unusually high 
level of transparency (Tuschoff 1999: 151). 
In the case of the EU, the collection of information of member states’ defense forces, 
armaments, and procurement plans has been left to the Western European Union 
(WEU). With the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), 
however, the EU is beginning to play a more active role in coordinating and 
overseeing the defense and procurement policy of its member states. So far, the so-
called Headline Goal process has more or less been a bottom-up venture. This is 
beginning to change, though. The European Capability Action Plan, designed to close 
the gap between the Headline Goal and actual contribution by member-states, 
envisages not only the close collaboration on individual defense projects, but also a 
wide-ranging exchange of sensitive information on armaments and procurement plans. 
The creation of the armament agency will intensify this exchange. With regard to the 
export of armaments and dual use goods, the European Code of Conduct has not only 
stimulated greater transparency on behalf of many member states. The Code of 
Conduct has also charged the EU with the collection and dissemination of sensitive 
data. The Working Party on Conventional Arms Exports (COARM), the Council’s 
working group responsible for operating the Code of Conduct, compiles and 
disseminates to all member states data on arms transfers, denied requests, and the 
outcome of the consultations, which ensue if one country considers responding 
positively to a request that had been denied by another member state.  
The OAS has started to improve its mechanisms for the collection and procession of 
information, an advancement which also applies to the security realm. From 1992 
onwards, the General Assembly has passed annual resolutions on confidence- and 
security-building measures (CSBM). Member states are increasingly sending their 
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actual information on CSBM, and some even provide figures on defense spending. 
These reports are stored by the General Secretariat and made publicly available on the 
website of the Committee on Hemispheric Security. Furthermore, the communication 
network of the OAS Information System (OASIS) shall be made operational for 
instant exchange of information on security matters.  
In the medium term, it is intended to collect member states' national doctrine and 
defense policy papers, as well as the information provided by the states parties 
pursuant to the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons 
Acquisitions. It is also planned to include relevant information from other sources, 
such as the information submitted by the member states to the UN Register of 
Conventional Arms, the UN Standardized International Reporting of Military 
Expenditures, the OAS Roster of Experts on Confidence- and Security-Building 
Measures, and the OAS Register of Antipersonnel Land Mines.   
In contrast to these efforts, Mercosur is characterized by a lesser degree of 
transparency (Malamud 2005a: 424). Mercosur does not collect or monitor any 
information on its member states’ foreign policy or the defense sector, which may be 
attributable to the fact that defense cooperation is mainly managed by bilateral 
institutions in the Southern Cone. However, Mercosur has directed its attention to the 
so-called new security threats like terrorism, organized crime and drug-trafficking, and 
in this context has developed new instruments, like the Sistema de Intercambio de 
Información de Seguridad del MERCOSUR (SISME), a subregional databank 
containing information on transnationally acting criminals. 
ASEAN does not gather information on member-state’s policy. The secretariat has no 
authority to attain or process information from the member states.13 Furthermore, no 
mandatory document exists that obliges members to reveal information regarding their 
defense or security policies. So far, the only exception to this rule is the ASEAN 
Regional Forum’s encouragement to report to the UN Register of Conventional Arms 
and to share long-term defense plans.  
 
 
5. Comparing the Communicative Arena of Regional Security Institutions 
 
5.1. Norms 
 
By the end of the Cold War, NATO was perceived by its members as a political 
community, and a norm of early consultation had clearly developed. At its inception, 
the character of the new alliance as well as the obligation to consult and to share 
information was rather contested. The United States sought to create a traditional 
collective defense organization which would contribute to the mobilization and the 
integration of the military potential of the Western European states, but which would 
infringe as little as possible on the American freedom-of-action. In contrast, Canada 
and some of the smaller European allies insisted on a more political organization. The 
North Atlantic Treaty reflects both views. While Article 5 portrays NATO as a 
                                                 
13 It remains to be seen whether with the ASEAN Charter, which is currently in the stage of debate, an 
empowerment of the secretariat – as many observers hope – can be achieved.  
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classical collective defense pact, Articles 2 and 4 call for closer economic and political 
collaboration. In practice, initially the American view prevailed. NATO’s early design 
envisaged a decentralized organization. Consultations, too, remained weak although an 
array of conflicts among members threatened the coherence of the alliance.  
The Korean War and the Suez crisis triggered a political shake-up. A Committee of 
Three Wise Men urged member states in 1956 to strengthen political, economic and 
cultural collaboration within NATO and called upon them to consult more closely on 
all matters which might affect their collective or individual security as envisaged in 
Article 4. The report stressed that “consultation within an alliance means more than 
exchange of information (...). It means the discussion of problems collectively, in the 
early stages of policy formation, and before national positions become fixed.”14 Later 
declarations and key statements, like the famous Harmel Report of 1967 and the June 
1974 Ottawa Declaration, reaffirmed the mutual obligation and expectation of early 
consultations. The April 1999 Alliance’s Strategic Concept again stresses that NATO 
will serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, as an essential 
transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issue that affects member states’ 
vital interests. 
In the case of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, the acquis politique, 
that is the entirety of politically binding basic documents, common declarations, 
resolution, and major decisions, clearly indicates the existence of a norm of early 
consultation. The Luxembourg Report of October 27, 1970 defined the 
accomplishment of a better mutual understanding of relevant aspects of international 
politics through a regular exchange of information and consultations as a major goal of 
the newly established European Political Cooperation (EPC). In its Copenhagen 
Report of July 23, 1973, the foreign ministers promised not to adopt a fixed national 
position without prior consultations within the EPC framework. The London Report of 
October 13, 1981 extended the competence of EPC into the security realm. The 
Solemn Declaration, adopted June 19, 1983 in Stuttgart, envisaged reinforced 
processes of consultation in order to enable member states to react collectively to 
challenges which confront them as a whole. Heads of states and governments 
underlined the commitment to take their partners’ positions fully into account. Article 
30(2) of the Single European Act obliges member states to consult with each other on 
all issues of general interest before adopting fixed national positions.15 Articles J.2 and 
J.3 of the Maastricht treaty reinforce this obligation. Article 16 of the Amsterdam 
Treaty succinctly determines that states inform and consult each other on all relevant 
foreign policy issues. The norm of early consultation is also emphasized in Article I-40 
of the European Constitution.  
In the case of the Latin American regional organizations, a practice of early 
consultation is just developing. Traditionally, members of the OAS gave precedence to 
the principle of non-intervention, which is pegged down in Article 1 of the OAS 
Charter. This is changing, however, as a number of observations seem to indicate that 
member states are beginning to use the organization as a platform to reveal future 
                                                 
14 The text of the Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO can be 
downloaded from NATO website: http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/bt-a3.htm. 
15 These documents are reprinted in: Auswärtiges Amt: Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik 
der Europäischen Union (GASP). Dokumentation, Bonn 1994 (10. Aufl.). 
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policy initiatives and to discuss possible approaches. As early as 1991, the Santiago 
Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System decided to 
initiate a process of consultation on hemispheric security. Subsequent declarations on 
confidence- and security-building measures as well as the Declaration on Security in 
the Americas, issued in 2003, expressed member states’ commitment to strengthen the 
organs, institutions and mechanisms of the Inter-American security system, and 
assigned the Committee on Hemispheric Security the task to develop common 
approaches to manage international security issues, including disarmament and arms 
control, and to serve as a forum for consultation on these matters. So far, however, 
those declarations of intent have not led to the formal establishment of norms of early 
consultation, and it is too early to state with certainty whether these signs of a changed 
practice will indeed lead to changed expectations and norms.  
Concerning Mercosur, some of its basic documents do indicate the existence of a norm 
of early consultation. In the economic realm, the Protocol of Brasilia, adopted in 1991, 
stipulates that parties should consult early in case of economic disturbances or 
conflicts and introduces arbitration mechanisms. The Protocol of Olivos on Dispute 
Settlement, adopted in 2002, also calls for early consultations to resolve disputes and 
creates a permanent appeals court. However, member states’ willingness to put it into 
action is not encouraging. Member states frequently insist on their national positions 
even if this means that pressing problems are resolved in a last-minute fashion by 
presidential consultation (Malamud 2005a, b). Even worse, many regional regulations 
are not applicable because they have not been ratified by every member state. Up to 
now, even in the economic realm, there is a contrast between the proclaimed ambitious 
goals of Mercosur and its poor institutional practice. 
But Mercosur, although originally designed as an economic institution, has inspired 
further collaboration: “In the field of defense and security, the logic behind Mercosur 
led to a pattern of cooperation and dialogue which also included these matters.” 
(Villagra Delgado 2003: 4). This cooperation is mainly happening by means of 
bilateral agreements and coordination mechanisms: The Brazilian-Argentine Agency 
for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was established in 1991, 
and the Mecanismo de Consulta y Coordinación sobre Defensa y Seguridad 
(Permanent Consultation and Coordination Mechanism on Defense and Security 
Matters), created in 1997, intends to bring together the Argentine and Brazilian 
ministers of foreign affairs and defense annually. Additionally, the Brazilian Ministry 
of Defense has initiated bilateral working groups on defense policy with all countries 
of the extended Mercosur, except for Paraguay. Argentina and Mercosur associate 
member Chile installed the Comité Permanente de Seguridad (Permanent Committee 
on Security) which brings together civilian actors from the ministries of defense and 
foreign affairs as well as representatives of the General Staff twice a year. These 
agreements are characterized by patterns of early consultation, too.  
The key ASEAN principles, often called the “ASEAN Way”, contain a number of 
procedural norms regulating regional cooperation (Haacke 2005). These norms 
envision consensual decision-making, strongly relying on consultations (known as the 
principle of musyawarah) between the state leaders in a process of quiet diplomacy 
(Rüland 2002). ASEAN has frequently been labeled a “talk-shop”, indicating the 
important role of informal dialogue as opposed to binding decision-making. 
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“Consultation” as a procedure of cooperation is mentioned in different key documents 
(the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, the ASEAN Vision 2020, the Hanoi Plan of 
Action, and the Second Declaration of ASEAN Concord), but its concrete meaning has 
never been defined. The norm of consultation prior to any decision-making within 
ASEAN is pronounced; yet, as politicians meet behind closed doors, there is no 
evidence that state positions may be open for debate. On the contrary, the fact that 
negotiations are routinely conducted on high administrative levels and that the 
majority of decisions reached in negotiations in ASEAN are based on a very minimal 
consensus indicates that national positions are clearly fixed in beforehand and not 
negotiable.  
Furthermore, one of the most prominent norms valid in ASEAN cooperation is non-
intervention in internal affairs. Due to the colonial heritage, all regional states have 
frequently stressed the primacy of their national sovereignty, and accordingly, the non-
intervention principle has attained overarching importance. When it comes to the 
practice of consultation, therefore, one has to keep in mind that no state has any 
interest in letting another state interfere with its domestic politics; this also suggests 
that state delegates come with fixed national positions that are non-negotiable.  
Most case studies on NATO and the EU confirm the assumption of intense and early 
consultations. Risse-Kappen’s (1997) study on the influence of small countries within 
NATO shows that early consultation has indeed been widely practiced. The 
importance of NATO’s consultation culture is also the subject of Theiler’s (1997) and 
Tuschoff’s (1999) study. Concerning the European Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, insider accounts and case studies confirm that EU members do indeed share 
even sensitive information and consult routinely and extensively before they adopt 
fixed national positions (Rummel 1978: 22; Rummel 1982; Hill/Wallace 1996; Nuttall 
1992; Nuttall 2000). Lindemann (1978) testified that this reflex is especially distinct in 
the case of international conference diplomacy. Smith (2001: 272) highlights “habits 
of consultation” which were increasingly influential.  
As for the Latin American and Southeast Asian security institutions, case studies do 
not mention a habit of early consultation. This neglect could either be due to the fact 
that intergovernmental negotiations do indeed take place only after national positions 
have been fixed or could be the result of a lack of interest. 
 
 
5.2. Decision-making Structure 
 
The Korean War triggered the transformation of NATO from a rather loose alliance 
into a highly institutionalized political organization where consultation takes place 
almost permanently on different topics and levels. Originally, it was envisaged that 
NATO’s superior body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), would meet only once a 
year, as would the Defense Committee comprising the defense ministers. It took until 
1952, before the Lisbon Ministerial turned the NAC into a permanent body consisting 
of government appointed permanent representatives (permreps) holding the rank of 
ambassadors. Since then, the NAC has been meeting in different formats. On the level 
of heads of state and governments, the NAC meets only sporadically. On the level of 
foreign ministers, the NAC meets twice a year. On the level of permreps, it meets 
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every Monday morning. Additionally, NATO ambassadors attend a weekly private 
luncheon to discuss all pending issues in a more informal setting (George 1991). 
Regardless of the format in which it meets, the NAC is always chaired by the 
Secretary General and always exerts the same authority. 
The Defense Planning Committee (DPC), which came into being in 1963 as a 
replacement of the original Defense Committee, is politically responsible for all 
matters pertaining to the integrated defense structure. This set-up is supplemented by 
the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), the third senior political-military body, which was 
founded in 1967. Both the DPC and the NPG are chaired by the Secretary General and 
meet twice a year on the level of defense ministers from member countries which take 
part in the integrated military structure. Both organs meet much more frequently on the 
level of permreps, the DPC weekly or even more often. Altogether, the Secretary 
General and the permreps meet almost daily. 
The frequent meetings of the permreps are just the tip of the iceberg of NATO’s 
political consultation and coordination. Under those three main committees, a myriad 
of subordinated committees and working groups has been established. A cursory count 
shows that in 2000 NATO’s political structure comprised 35 principal subordinated 
committees (NATO Handbook 2001).  In addition, a mushrooming number of regional 
expert groups and ad hoc political working groups exists. 
Representatives of the national representations as well as staff from the international 
secretariat attend the meetings of these subordinated committees. National 
representations vary in size. Luxemburg’s representation comprises six staffers, 
whereas the representations of the UK and the US employ 50 and 95 staffers, 
respectively (George 1991:18f.). NATO’s International Staff, the political wing of 
NATO, is headed by the Secretary General. He is supported by a deputy and several 
Assistant Secretary Generals who administer a vast and complex structure of divisions 
and directorates mirroring the structure of the subordinate committees under the NAC.  
NATO’s military wing is headed by the Military Committee and consists of a likewise 
complex structure of subordinated committees and military commands. NATO`s 
International Military Staff (IMS), part of its military wing, is headed by a director and 
consists mainly of military personnel. The Military Committee and the IMS, however, 
are only the tip of NATO’s vast military structure. NATO’s military command 
structure is composed of several ten thousand posts, turning NATO into a gigantic 
meeting place for the officer corps of its member countries.  
Europe’s foreign policy decision-making system has evolved in several stages. The 
Luxembourg Report introduced the European Political Cooperation (EPC). The Single 
European Act brought the EPC in the purview of the EC. Maastricht established the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as the second pillar of the EU. 
Amsterdam introduced the High Representative and refurbished the decision-making 
instruments. The Helsinki and Nice Summits created the European Security and 
Defense Policy (ESDP) and remodeled the institutional structure. The Convention was 
supposed to replace the three pillars with a more consistent institutional structure. This 
process is characterized both by a growing density of meetings, consultations, and 
exchanges of information, as well as by Brusselization.   
The European Council serves as the supreme decision-making body of the 
CFSP/ESDP. Since its early days, the frequency of its meetings has doubled to at least 
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four times a year. The General Council constitutes the most important decision-making 
center between two meetings of the European Council. It meets at least once a month 
(Gomez/Peterson 2001). This is a remarkable development since the Luxembourg 
Report envisaged two meetings of foreign ministers per year outside the Framework of 
the EU. The Political Committee (PC) and, since 2000, the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC) prepare the meetings of the council and implement its decisions.16  
The PC and the PSC form the crucial link between the council working groups and the 
council. The PC is composed of the political directors of the foreign ministries. The 
frequency of meetings grew rapidly from four in the early 1970s to approximately 12 
in the late 1980s and to 22 in the middle of the 1990s (Regelsberger 1997: 69). The 
PSC took over most of the functions of the PC without replacing it completely. In 
contrast to the PC, its members – which in most cases hold the rank of an ambassador - 
are based at their permanent representations in Brussels. This format allows a much 
higher frequency of meetings than the over-worked Political Directors would have 
been able to manage. Since the Swedish Presidency in 2001, the PSC has met at least 
twice a week. (Regelsberger 2004: 36).  
Working groups constitute the basis of the CFSP machinery and demonstrate most 
visibly the phenomenon of a Europeanization of national diplomacy. In 2003, 28 
working groups on almost all relevant regions and functional issues worked under the 
guidance of the PSC. Working groups bring together diplomats from the capitals 
and/or the permanent representations. Contacts among them are intensified by the 
Correspondance Européenne (COREU) telex-communication system, a non-
hierarchical, multilateral system that can be used even by junior diplomats to 
communicate simultaneously with all other EU states.  
Due to the less operational character of the CFSP, fewer diplomats served on European 
posts as compared to officers serving on NATO posts. However, the CFSP machinery, 
too, has knotted dense networks among European diplomats. Many insider accounts 
report that these regular contacts have not only fostered a corps d’esprit. They have 
also given rise to the establishment of independent channels of communication and 
information between foreign ministries. 
In the case of the OAS, the General Assembly is the supreme organ.  It meets annually 
at the level of foreign ministers. The formulation of political goals is primarily 
accomplished in these annual meetings. The Permanent Council carries out the 
decisions of the General Assembly or assigns their implementation to other OAS 
bodies. All member states – except Cuba - maintain permanent missions at the OAS 
headquarters in Washington, D.C. With 27 staffers, the permanent mission of the 
United States is the largest. Small states employ between two and six staffers. The 
head of the permanent missions has the rank of ambassador and represents his country 
during the meetings of the Permanent Council. Depending on the circumstances, the 
Permanent Council meets several times a month, if necessary even several times a 
week. During the 1990s the OAS has witnessed a further wave of institutionalization 
with the restructuring or creation of five specialized committees working under the 
Permanent Council. 
The OAS Secretariat has a comparatively high profile. In 2004, the staff of the General 
Secretariat totaled 630 people, out of which 234 were professional and 396 technical 
                                                 
16 The PC and the PSC share this role with the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). 
  
 
34
staff (OAS 2005a). The Secretary General is the most widely known representative of 
the OAS throughout the hemisphere. After a recent reform aiming at higher efficiency, 
the Secretary General now leads a cabinet composed of the directors of seven 
departments.  
The Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs is an OAS organ in 
security policy, which, however, does not meet on a regular basis, but can be convoked 
upon request of any member state to deal with problems of an urgent nature. 
Throughout the last decade there have only been two meetings, both in 2001 in 
reaction to the terrorist acts perpetrated within the territory of the United States on 
September 11. Defense and strategic cooperation often takes place outside the OAS 
framework. The most noteworthy discussion forum is the Defense Ministerial of the 
Americas Meeting, initiated in 1995 by the U.S. Secretary of Defense in Williamsburg, 
Virginia, and perpetuated biannually. 
The most important institutional innovation on the way to a collective management of 
defense and security issues has been the creation of the Committee on Hemispheric 
Security (CHS). It first came into existence in 1991 as a special committee through the 
provisions of the Santiago Commitment. In 1995, it became a permanent organ. It is 
chaired by the permanent representative of one of the member states and holds 
meetings at least once a month. The Permanent Council instructs the CHS to consider 
and take action on those General Assembly resolutions that pertain to hemispheric 
security. The Committee might also take into consideration other resolutions that, 
according to its Chair, are directly related to its agenda. As a consequence of the 
various Declarations on Confidence and Security Building Measures, the CHS was 
mandated to periodically constitute itself as the Forum for Confidence- and Security-
Building Measures, in order to review and evaluate existing CSBM and to discuss, 
consider, and propose new CSBM. The first meeting of this kind took place in April 
2005, the second one is scheduled for November 2006.  
Although there has been significant development in the OAS decision-making 
structures throughout the last 15 years, it is still predominantly an intergovernmental 
organization. Contacts of various levels of bureaucracy are the exception rather than 
the rule. OAS’s main achievement is the extension of its essential purposes, like 
democracy, human rights, and peaceful conflict resolution, to the entire hemisphere 
and the vitalization of the mere declaratory norms by the adoption of a number of new 
instruments and specialized organizations.  
Mercosur’s supreme organ is the Common Market Council which is comprised of the 
ministers of foreign affairs and the ministers of economy. The Council holds two 
meetings a year, at least one of them with the participation of the member states’ 
presidents. Decisions taken by the Common Market Council are implemented by the 
Common Market Group, composed of bureaucrats from the ministries of foreign 
affairs and economy, and the central banks. In the recent past, Mercosur has witnessed 
some important institutional developments. With the implementation of the Protocol of 
Ouro Preto (1994), the original administrative Secretariat was transformed from a 
body servicing the Common Market Group into a technical body with wider 
competences, servicing the whole Mercosur. Additionally, Ouro Preto introduced the 
Joint Parliamentary Commission, the Economic and Social Consultative Forum as well 
as the Mercosur Trade Commission. In October 2003, a Commission of Permanent 
  
 
35
Representatives was established, whose president is entitled to participate in high-level 
meetings and represent the bloc abroad, thus emulating the Secretary General of the 
United Nations or the OAS, or even the High Representative of the EU.  
In general, Mercosur’s institutional structure allows actors on different levels to 
participate in decision-making. However, some observers note the already mentioned 
difference between formal decision-making structure and the de facto practices. 
Malamud (2005b) shows that, especially in times of crisis, the usual Mercosur 
decision-making structures and rules were ignored, and states resorted to presidential 
diplomacy. Overall, it seems that the traditions of executive authority in the region 
tend to overwrite the institutional structure. And although the Presidents Lula and 
Kirchner have talked of reforming the organizational structures of Mercosur with the 
intention to increase representation within it, there have not been any official proposals 
in this direction, yet (Grugel 2006). In any case, intergovernmentalism suits the larger 
and more powerful member states since it means that they can shape outcomes.  
In the political realm, institutional growth is discernable as well. As early as 1996, in 
the Presidential Declaration on Political Dialogue between Mercosur member states, 
signed in Potrero de los Funes, the presidents of the Mercosur countries had expressed 
their political willingness to create a mechanism of political consultation. Two years 
later, the multilateral Foro de Consulta y Concertación Política (FCCP, Forum for 
Political Consultation and Coordination) was founded (Ugarte 2004: 153; Flemes 
2005). It is usually manned with high-ranking diplomats or bureaucrats from the 
ministries of foreign affairs. However, it is not a self-contained organ like the three 
new organs created by the Protocol of Ouro Preto, but an auxiliary organ to the 
Common Market Council, to which it can make recommendations. Its main 
responsibility is to systematize political cooperation between Mercosur member states 
by means of coordinating 15 working groups on diverse topics outside the framework 
of economic integration. In spring 2002, the Mercosur Council has assigned the task of 
coordinating meetings on the minister level to the new forum, including coordination 
of some main mechanisms combating “new security threats” like terrorism, organized 
crime, and drug-trafficking. In 2004, the FCCP was asked to develop a vision of South 
American integration, to be considered by the foreign ministers. It also maintains a 
working group on firearms and ammunitions, and the latest move initiated in 2005 was 
the conformation of a working group on multilateral politics, comprising the Mercosur 
members and associates and aiming at the elaboration of common foreign policy 
declarations and positions towards external actors or other international organizations. 
The FCCP members have already brought forward joint positions in meetings of 
international institutions, like the UN or the Summit of the Americas. Its sessions take 
place twice a semester, so that between its formation and December 2005, the FCCP 
has held 40 meetings. 
ASEAN has been and still is a predominantly intergovernmental institution. Contacts 
between member states are maintained via ministerial meetings and only to a lesser 
extent between national bureaucracies.17 State leaders and foreign ministers formulate 
political goals in the high politics sector and have decision-making competencies 
                                                 
17 Yet, new fora and regular meetings, e.g. between embassy staff of the ASEAN members in Jakarta, 
have been emerging lately. Interview with Ngurah Swajayah (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia) 
in June 2006 in Jakarta.  
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regarding ASEAN. Additionally, Senior Officials from the foreign ministries belong to 
the top elite of ASEAN decision-making. Decisions are prepared by Senior Officials 
Meetings (SOM). The ASEAN Standing Committee (ASC) convened by the (rotating) 
ASEAN chair co-ordinates ASEAN activities.  
The number of meetings of ASEAN bodies has increased over the last decades (Dosch 
1997). In 2003, the ASEAN calendar lists five meetings of heads of government, four 
meetings of ASEAN foreign ministers, and 22 other ministerial meetings in the 
political and security sector. The ASC meets three to five times a year, and there are 
usually more than 40 Senior Official Meetings (ASEAN Annual Report 2004).18 These 
figures indicate the high relevance attached to meetings on the top bureaucratic levels; 
as neither the ASEAN secretariat nor the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) are supplied 
with differentiated institutional structures, top level meetings may often offer the only 
contacts between representatives of member states.  
Other ministries and government agencies are involved in policy-making as well, for 
example the ministries of economics, trade and industry, national development 
agencies, and strategic institutes belonging to the government sector. Defense and 
strategic cooperation relies on separate networks between ministries and agencies that 
have developed from bi- or trilateral security partnerships, often outside the institution. 
The defense ministers meet within the ARF framework or in accompanying track two 
fora, but not in the context of ASEAN security cooperation. 
Unlike in the EU or NATO, there are no permanent representatives at the ASEAN 
headquarters. Instead, desk officers seconded by member-states operate as transmitters 
between the domestic and the institutional level.  
The secretariat has a rather low profile: it is comparatively small and responsible 
solely for administrative tasks, without being endowed with any decision-making 
functions. At the first Bali summit in 1976, a small secretariat was established, and 
was restructured and endowed with more staff following the summit in 1992. The 
organizational structure of the secretariat today consists of the Secretary General, two 
deputies (responsible for functional and economic cooperation respectively), four 
Director Generals (economic cooperation, finance and integration support, external 
relations, and resources development) and the office of the Secretary General. The 
staff of the ASEAN secretariat performs primarily administrative tasks.19  
After the shock of the Asian crisis, the ASEAN Troika was created as a new 
instrument to improve ad-hoc decision-making and prevent intra-ASEAN conflict 
(Narine 2002: 164). The troika consists of three foreign ministers (the current, former 
and future chairs of the Standing Committee) and is an ad-hoc committee designated 
for immediate and effective crisis management (Acharya 2001). A consensus from all 
ASEAN foreign ministers is needed for its activation. Although this mechanism was 
generally approved, the ASEAN Troika has not been used yet.  
                                                 
18 Available at: http://www.aseansec.org/ar05.htm (accessed in July 2005). In 1995, the total number 
of official meetings was indicated as 191 – compared to about 700 in 2006, however, including 
conferences and workshops. (Dosch 1997:85; Interview with Ngurah Swajayah, Minstry of Foreign 
Affairs, ASEAN Cooperation, Jakarta, June 2006).  
19 Interview with Dato’ Ahmad Mokhtar Selat (former Director General of ASEAN) in July 2006 in 
Kuala Lumpur. 
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To conclude, ASEAN differs from NATO and the EU as well as from Mercosur and 
the OAS with regard to the communicative arena. So far, communication within 
ASEAN has been monopolized by chief executives. Institutionalized contacts among 
specialized bureaucracies are far less developed as compared with the European and 
Latin American institutions. This system of close personal contacts had its merits, 
though. The highly personalized atmosphere, the longevity of important leaders, and 
the continuity of dialogues among national power elites has rendered each partner’s 
position rather predictable. At the same time, the hierarchical, minimalist structure of 
the institution poses obstacles for developing diversified processes of decision-making. 
Whether this system is sustainable as new elites attain power, and whether ongoing 
institutional reforms come to fruition remains to be seen. Again, the prospective 
ASEAN Charter and the vision of strengthening the Secretariat and improving contacts 
with societal actors may offer the most fundamental change here.  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Although the five security institutions discussed here are designed to perform similar 
tasks and although at a first glance their institutional structures show interesting 
similarities, they are strikingly different with regard to our form characteristics.  
 
Table 2: Summary of embeddedness and arena (year of comparison: 2000) 
 EU NATO OAS Mercosur ASEAN 
 
Indicator for 
Embeddedness 
 
Access of Interest 
Groups 
very high medium low but 
increasing 
medium low 
 
Media Coverage 
and Access 
high high low medium not 
important 
Influence of 
Parliamentary 
Assembly 
high medium rather low rather low low  
Monitoring 
Facilities 
very 
distinct 
very 
distinct 
medium low low 
Indicator for 
Arena 
 
Norms of Early 
Consultation 
very 
distinct 
very 
distinct 
slowly 
developing 
slowly 
developing 
slowly 
developing 
Degree of 
Institutionalization 
high high low, but 
increasing 
low, but 
increasing 
low 
 
Case Studies strong 
accounts 
strong 
accounts 
no 
accounts 
no 
accounts 
no 
accounts 
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While NATO and the EU are deeply embedded in networks of societal and 
parliamentary actors of their member states, both ASEAN and the OAS were 
characterized by intergovernmental structures. And while NATO and the EU brought 
together entire bureaucracies and covered the entire policy cycle, policy-making 
within ASEAN and the OAS involved primarily the chief executives and pertained 
only to the last stages of the policy cycle.  
With the democratization processes in Latin America, institutional characteristics 
began to change. Mercosur as well as the OAS have developed closer and more 
institutionalized relations with societal actors and parliaments, and both of them 
witness a wave of institutional evolution, indicating growing arenas. Although the 
security situation in Southeast Asia is more fragile than in the Southern Cone, ASEAN 
is still lagging behind. The fragile Southeast Asian democracies, still a minority among 
ASEAN’s members, have just begun to request ASEAN to step down from its aloof 
place and develop ties with member states’ societies. 
This paper focuses on an analysis of institutional form and does not deal with the 
causal relationship between form and effectiveness. Whether NATO and the EU have 
been able to contribute to stable peace in Europe because of their specific form and 
whether their lack of embeddedness and their narrow arena prevented ASEAN and the 
OAS from establishing stable peace in their regions will be discussed in a second part 
of the research project. However, since our two form characteristics are closely related 
to the level of information geared through and generated by the institution, and since 
the availability of credible information has been identified as the major key for the 
prevention of war and a prerequisite for cooperation, we would already at this point 
claim to have identified a previously neglected causal mechanism which might help us 
to understand why some institutions contribute to peace among their member states, 
whereas others do not.  
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Appendix: Regional Security Organizations 
 
Name Founded Security relevant 
Objectives 
Members Principal Organs Homepage 
African 
Union  
(AU) 
2002 To achieve unity and 
solidarity among 
African countries [...] 
accelerate the political 
and socio-economic 
integration of the 
continent 
53 Assembly of Heads 
of State and 
Government, 
Executive Council, 
Committee of 
Permanent 
Representatives and 
the Commission, 
Peace and Security 
Council. 
www.africa-union.org 
Comunidad 
Andina 
(CAN) 
1996 To foster close ties 
among member 
countries. An Andean 
Charter for Peace and 
Security was adopted 
in June 2002 with a 
view to strengthening 
subregional security. 
5 Andean Presidential 
Council, the Andean 
Council of Foreign 
Ministers, the 
Commission, the 
General Secretariat, 
the Andean 
Parliament, Court of 
Justice. 
www.comunidadandina.org
ANZUS 
 Pact 
1952 co-ordinate the 
defence of the three 
contracting parties in 
order to preserve 
peace and security in 
the Pacific” 
3 Council (consists of 
Foreign Ministers or 
their deputies). 
www.dfat.gov.au 
ASEAN 
Regional 
Forum 
1993 A key instrument for 
dialogue on political 
and security concerns 
with a view to 
establishing a strong 
foundation of trust and 
confidence among its 
participants 
24 Minimal 
institutionalization:  
Meetings at the level 
of Foreign Ministers. 
www.aseansec.org 
Association 
of Southeast 
Asian 
Nations 
(ASEAN) 
1967 In 1995, the Heads of 
State and Government 
stressed that 
‘cooperative peace 
and shared prosperity 
shall be the 
fundamental goals of 
ASEAN’. 
11 Meeting of the Heads 
of State and 
Government, 
Ministerial Meeting at 
the level of Foreign 
Ministers,  numerous 
other ministerial 
meetings, permanent 
central Secretariat. 
www.aseansec.org 
Carribean 
Community 
1973 To foster unity among 
peoples of the 
Caribbean through 
common or co-
ordinated regional 
actions in spheres 
ranging from foreign 
policy to health. 
15 Conference of Heads 
of Government, 
Community Council 
of Ministers, four 
Ministerial Councils, 
Secretariat, 
Caribbean Court of 
Justice. 
www.caricom.org 
Community 
of Sahel and 
Saharan 
States 
(CEN-SAD) 
1998 A framework for 
integration and 
complementarity 
among member 
countries with a view 
to strengthening 
peace, security and 
stability. 
 
 
 
18 Conference of the 
Heads of State 
meeting, Executive 
Council at ministerial 
level, General 
Secretariat. 
www.cen-sad.org 
  
 
50
Name Founded Security relevant 
Objectives 
Members Principal Organs Homepage 
Co-operation 
Council for 
the Arab 
States of the 
Gulf 
(GCC) 
1981 To preserve their 
sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and 
independence and to 
ensure the stability 
and security of the 
Gulf region  
6 Supreme Council 
consists of the Heads 
of State, Ministerial 
Council consists of 
the Foreign Ministers, 
30-member 
Consultative 
Commission, 
Secretariat General. 
www.gcc-sg.org 
ECCAS 
Economic 
Community 
of Central 
African 
States 
1983 To promote regional 
security among 
countries in Central 
Africa. 
11 Conference of Heads 
of State and 
Government, Council 
of Ministers, 
Secretariat. 
www.ceeac-eccas.org 
Economic 
Community 
of West 
African 
States 
(ECOWAS) 
1975 To develop co-
operation in the 
political and security 
fields.  
The prevention and 
settlement of regional 
conflicts through 
“solidarity and 
collective self-
reliance”. 
15 Authority of Heads of 
State and 
Government, the 
Council of Ministers, 
the Executive 
Secretariat, and the 
Fund for Co-
operation, 
Compensation and 
Development. 
www.sec.ecowas.int 
European 
Union 
(EU) 
1993 To maintain and 
develop the Union as 
an area of freedom, 
security and justice.  
25 European Council, 
European Parliament, 
Council of the 
European Union, 
European 
Commission, Court of 
Justice of the 
European 
Communities. 
www.europarl.eu.int 
 
www.europa,eu.int/comm 
 
www.ue.eu.int 
GUUAM 
Group 
1997 The strengthening of 
regional security, 
including co-operation 
in combating 
separatism and the 
peaceful resolution of 
conflicts in member 
countries. 
5 Meeting of the Heads 
of State, Sessions of 
the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs, 
committee of National 
Co-ordinators. 
www.guuam.org 
League of 
Arab States 
1945 To strengthen the ties 
between Arab 
countries, to co-
ordinate their policies 
and activities, to 
safeguard their 
sovereignty, and to 
consider in a general 
way the affairs and 
interests of the Arab 
countries. 
22 Council, number of 
Committees and the 
General Secretariat. 
www.arableagueonline.org 
Mercosur 1991 The four members 
(plus Bolivia and 
Chile) have set up a 
Mechanism for 
Political Consultation 
and Concertation 
(‘Political Mercosur). 
 
 
4 Council oft the 
Common Market, 
Common Market 
Group, Trade 
Commission, Joint 
Parliamentary 
Commission, 
Economic and Social 
Consultative Forum, 
Administrative 
Secretariat. 
 
www.mercosur.org.uy 
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Name Founded Security relevant 
Objectives 
Members Principal Organs Homepage 
North 
Atlantic 
Treaty 
Organization 
(NATO) 
1949 To ensure their joint 
security through co-
operation and 
consultation in political 
and military fields. 
26 North Atlantic Council 
(at the level of 
Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs, Heads of 
State and 
Government or 
permanent 
representatives). 
Defence Planning 
Committee, 
Secretary-General 
and numerous 
Committees. 
www.nato.int 
Organization 
for Security 
and Co-
operation in 
Europe 
(OSCE) 
1994 To foster security and 
stability in all their 
dimension on the 
basis of a 
comprehensive and 
co-operative 
approach. 
55 Ministerial Council, 
Permanent Council, 
Senior Council, 
Forum for Security 
Co-operation, 
Secretariat and the 
OSCE Parliamentary 
Assembly. 
www.osce.org 
Organization 
of American 
States 
(OAS) 
1948 To promote peace and 
security and economic 
and social 
development in the 
western hemisphere, 
to strengthen and to 
speed the process of 
economic integration 
among the nations of 
the Americas. 
35 General Assembly, 
the Permanent 
Council, and the 
Inter-American 
Council for integral 
Development, 
General Secretariat. 
www.oas.org 
Organisation 
of Eastern 
Caribbean 
States 
(OECS) 
1981 To strengthen the 
security of these 
smaller countries of 
the Eastern Caribbean 
and to foster their 
development and 
harmonize their 
foreign policies. 
7 Authority of Heads of 
Government,  
Foreign Affairs 
Committee, Defence 
and Security 
Committee, 
Secretariat. 
www.oecs.org 
Organisation 
of the Islamic 
Conference 
(OIC) 
1971 To promote effective 
solidarity and to 
strengthen co-
operation among 
Islamic countries in 
the economic, social 
and political fields. 
57 Conference of Kings 
and Heads of State 
and Government, 
Conference of 
Foreign Ministers and 
the Secretariat. 
www.oic.oci.org 
Shanghai 
Co-operation  
Organisation 
(SCO) 
2001 To promote co-
operation with a view 
to ensuring peace, 
security, stability and 
economic 
development in 
Central Asia. 
6 Council of Heads of 
State, council of 
Heads of 
Government, Council 
of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs, 
Conference of Heads 
of Agencies, Council 
of National Co-
ordinators, 
Secretariat, Regional 
Anti-Terrorism 
Structure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://www.sectsco.org/ 
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Objectives 
Members Principal Organs Homepage 
South Asian 
Association 
for Regional 
Co-operation 
(SAARC) 
1985 To promote collective 
self-reliance among 
the member countries.
7 Meeting of Heads of 
State of government, 
Council of Ministers, 
Standing Committee 
of Foreign 
Secretaries, 
Technical 
Committees and the 
Secretariat. 
www.saarc-sec.org 
Southern 
African 
Development 
Community 
(SADC) 
1992 To strengthen regional 
solidarity, peace and 
security. 
14 Summit Meeting of 
Heads of State or 
Government, 
Committee of 
Officials and the 
Secretariat. 
www.sadc.int 
West African 
Economic 
and 
Monetary 
Union 
(UEMOA) 
1994 The attainment of 
regional peace and 
security is now 
considered to be 
among the Union’s 
goals. 
8 Conférence des 
Chefs d'État, le 
Conseil des 
Ministres, la 
Commission de 
l'UEMOA, la Cour de 
Justice, la Cour des 
Comptes et le Comité 
Interparlementaire 
Chambre Consulaire 
Régionale, Banque 
Centrale des États de 
l'Afrique de l'Ouest 
(BCEAO) et la 
Banque Ouest-
Africaine de 
Développement. 
www.uemoa.int 
Western 
European 
Union 
(WEU) 
1948 To promote the unity 
and encouraging the 
progressive 
integration of Europe 
through the co-
ordination  of the 
defence policy and 
equipment of member 
countries. 
10 Council (consisting of 
Foreign and Defence 
Ministers), Assembly, 
WEU Institute for 
Security Studies. 
www.weu.int 
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